All you who study medicine have, one may say, humanity for
your profession: and I think that one who preferred your science to all
the serious pursuits of life would form the proper judgment, and not miss
the right decision, if it be true that life, the most valued of all things,
is a thing to be shunned, and full of pain, if it may not be had with health,
and health your art supplies. But in your own case the science is in a
notable degree of double efficacy; you enlarge for yourself the bounds
of its humanity, since you do not limit the benefit of your art to men's
bodies, but take thought also for the cure of troubles of the mind. I say
this, not only following the common reports, but because I have learnt
it from experience, as in many other matters, so especially at this time
in this indescribable malice of our enemies, which you skilfully dispersed
when it swept like some evil flood over our life, dispelling this violent
inflammation of our heart by your fomentation of soothing words. I thought
it right, indeed, in view of the continuous and varied effort of our enemies
against us, to keep silence, and to receive their attack quietly, rather
than to speak against men armed with falsehood, that most mischievous weapon,
which sometimes drives its point even through truth. But you did well in
urging me not to betray the truth, but to refute the slanderers, lest,
by a success of falsehood against truth, many might be injured.
I may say that those who conceived this causeless hatred for us seemed
to be acting very much on the principle of Aesop's fable. For just as he
makes his wolf bring some charges against the lamb (feeling ashamed, I
suppose, of seeming to destroy, without just pretext, one who had done
him no hurt), and then, when the lamb easily swept away all the slanderous
charges brought against him, makes the wolf by no means slacken his attack,
but carry the day with his teeth when he is vanquished by justice; so those
who were as keen for hatred against us as if it were something good (feeling
perhaps some shame of seeming to hate without cause), make up charges and
complaints against us, while they do not abide consistently by any of the
things they say, but allege, now that one thing, after a little while that
another, and then again that something else is the cause of their hostility
to us. Their malice does not take a stand on any ground, but when they
are dislodged from one charge they cling to another, and from that again
they seize upon a third, and if all their charges are refuted they do not
give up their hate. They charge us with preaching three Gods, and din into
the ears of the multitude this slander, which they never rest from maintaining
persuasively. Then truth fights on our side, for we show both publicly
to all men, and privately to those who converse with us, that we anathematize
any man who says that there are three Gods, and hold him to be not even
a Christian. Then, as soon as they hear this, they find Sabellius a handy
weapon against us, and the plague that he spread is the subject of continual
attacks upon us. Once more, we oppose to this assault our wonted armour
of truth, and show that we abhor this form of heresy just as much as Judaism.
What then? are they weary after such efforts, and content to rest? Not
at all. Now they charge us with innovation, and frame their complaint against
us in this way:-They allege that while we confess1 three Persons we say
that there is one goodness, and one power, and one Godhead. And in this
assertion they do not go beyond the truth; for we do say so. But the ground
of their complaint is that their custom does not admit this, and Scripture
does not support it. What then is our reply? We do not think that it is
right to make their prevailing custom the law and rule of sound doctrine.
For if custom is to avail for2 proof of soundness, we too, surely, may
advance our prevailing custom; and if they reject this, we are surely not
bound to follow theirs. Let the inspired Scripture, then, be our umpire,
and the vote of truth will surely be given to those whose dogmas are found
to agree with the Divine words.
Well, what is their charge? There are two brought forward together in
the accusation against us; one, that we divide the Persons; the other,
that we do not employ any of the names which belong to God in the plural
number, but (as I said already) speak of the goodness as one, and of the
power, and the Godhead, and all such attributes in the singular. With regard
to the dividing of the Persons, those cannot well object who hold the doctrine
of the diversity of substances in the Divine nature. For it is not to be
supposed that those who say that there are three substances do not also
say that there are three Persons. So this point only is called in question:
that those attributes which are ascribed to the Divine nature we employ
in the singular.
But our argument in reply to this is ready and clear. For any one who
condemns those who say that the Godhead is one, must necessarily support
either those who say that there are more than one, or those who say that
there is none. But the inspired teaching does not allow us to say that
there are more than one, since, whenever it uses the term, it makes mention
of the Godhead in the singular; as,-"In Him dwelleth all the fulness of
the Godhead3 "; and, elsewhere,-"The invisible things of Him from the foundation
of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made, even His eternal power and Godhead4 ." If, then, to extend the number
of the Godhead to a multitude belongs to those only who suffer from the
plague of polytheistic error, and on the other hand utterly to deny the
Godhead would be the doctrine of atheists, what doctrine is that which
accuses us for saying that the Godhead is one? But they reveal more clearly
the aim of their argument. As regards the Father, they admit the fact that
He is God5 , and that the Son likewise is honoured with the attribute of
Godhead; but the Spirit, Who is reckoned with the Father and the Son, they
cannot include in their conception of Godhead, but hold that the power
of the Godhead, issuing from the Father to the Son, and there halting,
separates the nature of the Spirit from the Divine glory. And so, as far
as we may in a short space, we have to answer this opinion also.
What, then, is our doctrine? The Lord, in delivering the saving Faith
to those who become disciples of the word, joins with the Father and the
Son the Holy Spirit also; and we affirm that the union of that which has
once been joined is continual; for it is not joined in one thing, and separated
in others. But the power of the Spirit, being included with the Father
and the Son in the life-giving power, by which our nature is transferred
from the corruptible life to immortality, and in many other cases also,
as in the conception of "Good," and "Holy," and "Eternal," "Wise," "Righteous,"
"Chief," "Mighty," and in fact everywhere, has an inseparable association
with them in all the attributes ascribed in a sense of special excellence.
And so we consider that it is right to think that that which is joined
to the Father and the Son in such sublime and exalted conceptions is not
separated from them in any. For we do not know of any differences by way
of superiority and inferiority in attributes which express our conceptions
of the Divine nature, so that we should suppose it an act of piety (while
allowing to the Spirit community in the inferior attributes) to judge Him
unworthy of those more exalted. For all the Divine attributes, whether
named or conceived, are of like rank one with another, in that they are
not distinguishable in respect of the signification of their subject. For
the appellation of "the Good" does not lead our minds to one subject, and
that of "the Wise," or "the Mighty," or "the Righteous" to another, but
the thing to which all the attributes point is one; and, if you speak of
God, you signify the same Whom you understood by the other attributes.
If then all the attributes ascribed to the Divine nature are of equal force
as regards their designation of the subject, leading our minds to the same
subject in various aspects, what reason is there that one, while allowing
to the Spirit community with the Father and the Son in the other attributes,
should exclude Him from the Godhead alone? It is absolutely necessary either
to allow to Him community in this also, or not to admit His community in
the others. For if He is worthy in the case of those attributes, He is
surely not less worthy in this. But if He is "less," according to their
phrase6 , so that He is excluded from community with the Father and the
Son in the attribute of Godhead, neither is He worthy to share in any other
of the attributes which belong to God. For the attributes, when rightly
understood and mutually compared by that notion which we contemplate in
each case, will be found to imply nothing less than the appellation of
"God." And a proof of this is that many even of the inferior existences
are called by this very name. Further, the Divine Scripture is not sparing
in this use of the name even in the case of things incongruous, as when
it names idols by the appellation of God. For it says, "Let the gods that
have not made the heavens and the earth perish, and be cast down beneath
the earth7 "; and, "all the gods of the heathen are devils8 "; and the
witch in her incantations, when she brings up for Saul the spirits that
he sought for, says that she "saw gods9 ." And again Balaam, being an augur
and a seer, and engaging in divination, and having obtained for himself
the instruction of devils and magical augury, is said in Scripture to receive
counsel from God10 . One may show by collecting many instances of the same
kind from the Divine Scripture, that this attribute has no supremacy over
the other attributes which are proper to God, seeing that, as has been
said, we find it predicated, in an equivocal sense, even of things incongruous;
but we are nowhere taught in Scripture that the names of "the Holy," "the
Incorruptible," "the Righteous," "the Good," are made common to things
unworthy. If, then, they do not deny that the Holy Spirit has community
with the Father and the Son in those attributes which, in their sense of
special excellence, are piously predicated only of the Divine nature, what
reason is there to pretend that He is excluded from community in this only,
wherein it was shown that, by an equivocal use, even devils and idols share?
But they say that this appellation is indicative of nature, and that,
as the nature of the Spirit is not common to the Father and the Son, for
this reason neither does he partake in the community of this attribute.
Let them show, then, whereby they discern this diversity of nature. For
if it were possible that the Divine nature should be contemplated in its
absolute essence, and that we should find by appearances what is and what
is not proper to it, we should surely have no need of other arguments or
evidence for the comprehension of the question. But since it is exalted
above the understanding of the questioners, and we have to argue from some
particular evidence about those things which evade our knowledge11 , it
is absolutely necessary for us to be guided to the investigation of the
Divine nature by its operations. If, then, we see that the operations which
are wrought by the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ one from
the other, we shall conjecture from the different character of the operations
that the natures which operate are also different. For it cannot be that
things which differ in their very nature should agree in the form of their
operation: fire does not chill, nor ice give warmth, but their operations
are distinguished together with the difference between their natures. If,
on the other hand, we understand that the operation of the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit is one, differing or varying in nothing, the oneness
of their nature must needs be inferred from the identity of their operation.
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit alike give sanctification, and
life, and light, and comfort, and all similar graces. And let no one attribute
the power of sanctification in an especial sense to the Spirit, when he
hears the Saviour in the Gospel saying to the Father concerning His disciples,
"Father, sanctify them in Thy name12 ." So too all the other gifts are
wrought in those who are worthy alike by the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit: every grace and power, guidance, life, comfort, the change to immortality,
the passage to liberty, and every other boon that exists, which descends
to us.
But the order of things which is above us, alike in the region of intelligence
and in that of sense (if by what we know we may form conjectures about
those things also which are above us), is itself established within the
operation and power of the Holy Spirit, every man receiving the benefit
according to his own desert and need. For although the arrangement and
ordering of things above our nature is obscure to our sense, yet one may
more reasonably infer, by the things which we know, that in them too the
power of the Spirit works, than that it is banished from the order existing
in the things above us. For he who asserts the latter view advances his
blasphemy in a naked and unseemly shape, without being able to support
his absurd opinion by any argument. But he who agrees that those things
which are above us are also ordered by the power of the Spirit with the
Father and the Son, makes his assertion on this point with the support
of clear evidence from his own life. For13 as the nature of man is compounded
of body and soul, and the angelic nature has for its portion life without
a body, if the Holy Spirit worked only in the case of bodies, and the soul
were not capable of receiving the grace that comes from Him, one might
perhaps infer from this, if the intellectual and incorporeal nature which
is in us were above the power of the Spirit, that the angelic life too
was in no need of His grace. But if the gift of the Holy Spirit is principally
a grace of the soul, and the constitution of the soul is linked by its
intellectuality and invisibility to the angelic life, what person who knows
how to see a consequence would not agree, that every intellectual nature
is governed by the ordering of the Holy Spirit? For since it is said "the
angels do alway behold the Face of My Father which is in heaven14 ," and
it is not possible to behold the person of the Father otherwise than by
fixing the sight upon it through His image; and the image of the person
of the Father is the Only-begotten, and to Him again no man can draw near
whose mind has not been illumined by the Holy Spirit, what else is shown
from this but that the Holy Spirit is not separated from any operation
which is wrought by the Father and the Son? Thus the identity of operation
in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit shows plainly the undistinguishable character
of their substance. So that even if the name of Godhead does indicate nature,
the community of substance shows that this appellation is properly applied
also to the Holy Spirit. But I know not how these makers-up of all sorts
of arguments bring the appellation of Godhead to be an indication of nature,
as though they had not heard from the Scripture that it is a matter of
appointment15 , in which way nature does not arise. For Moses was appointed
as a god of the Egyptians, since He Who gave him the oracles, &c.,
spoke thus to him, "I have given thee as a god to Pharaoh16 ." Thus the
force of the appellation is the indication of some power, either of oversight
or of operation. But the Divine nature itself, as it is, remains unexpressed
by all the names that are conceived for it, as our doctrine declares. For
in learning that He is beneficent, and a judge, good, and just, and all
else of the same kind, we learn diversities of His operations, but we are
none the more able to learn by our knowledge of His operations the nature
of Him Who works. For when one gives a definition of any one of these attributes,
and of the nature to which the names are applied, he will not give the
same definition of both: and of things of which the definition is different,
the nature also is distinct. Indeed the substance is one thing whichno
definition has been found to express, and the significance of the names
employed concerning it varies, as the names are given from some operation
or accident. Now the fact that there is no distinction in the operations
we learn from the community of the attributes, but of the difference in
respect of nature we find no clear proof, the identity of operations indicating
rather, as we said, community of nature. If, then, Godhead is a name derived
from operation, as we say that the operation of the Father, and the Son,
and the Holy Spirit is one, so we say that the Godhead is one: or if, according
to the view of the majority, Godhead is indicative of nature, since we
cannot find any diversity in their nature, we not unreasonably define the
Holy Trinity to be of one Godhead17 .
But if any one were to call this appellation indicative of dignity,
I cannot tell by what reasoning he drags the word to this significance.
Since however one may hear many saying things of this kind, in order that
the zeal of its opponents may not find a ground for attacking the truth,
we go out of our way with those who take this view, to consider such an
opinion, and say that, even if the name does denote dignity, in this case
too the appellation will properly befit the Holy Spirit. For the attribute
of kingship denotes all dignity; and "our God," it says, "is King from
everlasting18 ." But the Son, having all things which are the Father's,
is Himself proclaimed a King by Holy Scripture. Now the Divine Scripture
says that the Holy Spirit is the unction of the Only-Begotten19 , interpreting
the dignity of the Spirit by a transference of the terms commonly used
in this world. For as, in ancient days, in those who were advanced to kingship,
the token of this dignity was the unction which was applied to them, and
when this took place there was thenceforth a change from private and humble
estate to the superiority of rule, and he who was deemed worthy of this
grace received after his anointing another name, being called, instead
of an ordinary man, the Anointed of the Lord: for this reason, that the
dignity of the Holy Spirit might be more clearly shown to men, He was called
by the Scripture "the sign of the Kingdom," and "Unction," whereby we are
taught that the Holy Spirit shares in the glory and kingdom of the Only-begotten
Son of God. For as in Israel it was not permitted to enter upon the kingdom
without the unction being previously given, so the word, by a transference
of the terms in use among ourselves, indicates the equality of power, showing
that not even the kingdom of the Son is received without the dignity of
the Holy Spirit. And for this reason He is properly called Christ, since
this name gives the proof of His inseparable and indivisible conjunction
with the Holy Spirit. If, then, the Only-begotten God is the Anointed,
and the Holy Spirit is His Unction, and the appellation of Anointed20 points
to the Kingly authority, and the anointing is the token of His Kingship,
then the Holy Spirit shares also in His dignity. If, therefore, they say
that the attribute of Godhead is significative of dignity, and the Holy
Spirit is shown to share in this last quality, it follows that He Who partakes
in the dignity will also partake in the name which represents it.
1 Reading omologountaj with Oehler. The Paris Edit. reads
omologountwn, and so also the Benedictine S. Basil. The Latin translator
of 1615, however, renders as if he had read omologountaj.
2 Reading eij orqothtoj apodeicin, with Oehler and the
Benedictine S. Basil. The Paris Edit. of 1615 reads eij orqothta logou.
3 Col. ii. 9.
4 Rom. i. 20.
5 Reading, with Oehler, to qeon einai.
6 Reading with Oehler ei de mikroteron ...estin, wste
...kexwrisqai The Paris Edit. and the Benedictine S. Basil read ei de mikroteron
...estin, h wste ...xwrhsai. "If, according to their phrase, He is too
small to be capable of community," &c. Oehler's reading seems to fit
better in the argument. If the new idea of "capacity" had been introduced
at this point, we should expect some other phrase than metexein acion at
the end of the sentence.
7 Cf. Jer. x. 11.
8 Ps. xcvi. 5 (LXX.).
9 1 Sam. xxviii. 13.
10 Num. xxii.
11 Oehler and Migne's edit. of S. Basil here read gnwsin,
the Paris Edit. and the Benedictine S. Basil have mnhmnh.
12 Cf. S. John xvii. 11 and John xvii.17.
13 This sentence and the passage following, down to the
words "is wrought by the Father and the Son," are omitted in the editions
of S. Basil.
14 S. Matt. xviii. 10.
15 Reading oti xeirotonhth, h fusij ginetai. The Paris
Edit. and Migne's S. Basil read oti xeirotonia h fusij ginetai: Ben. S.
Basil and Oehler read oti xeirotonhth fusij ou ginetai. The point of the
argument seems to be that "Godhead" is spoken of in Scripture as being
given by appointment, which excludes the idea of its being indicative of
"nature." Gregory shows that it is so spoken of; but he does not show that
Scripture asserts the distinction between nature and appointment, which
the reading of the Benedictine text and Oehler would require him to do.
16 Ex. vii. 1.
17 The treatise, as it appears in S. Basil's works, ends
here.
18 Ps. lxxiv. 12.
19 Acts x. 38.
20 Reading with Oehler Cristou in place of Qeou (the reading
of the Paris edition).
