
1 The Bible in a Post-Critical¹ Age

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Christian theology is thinking, which is faithful participation in God's self-revelation in the Holy Scriptures of our religion. Those who use the Book of Common Prayer (1662) are reminded on the Fourth Sunday after Trinity of the logic which necessitates the divine revelation recorded in the Holy Scriptures of the Christian Church.² 'Can the blind lead the blind?' asks Jesus in the Gospel. 'Shall they not both fall into the ditch?' Our Lord goes on to assert forcefully the blindness of fallen humanity. 'How canst thou say to thy brother, Brother, let me pull out the mote that is in thine eye, when thou thyself beholdest not the beam that is in thine eye?' The Epistle, from St Paul's Letter to the Romans, brings out that the journey we are too blind to lead is the movement of creation from the bondage and pain of corruptibility into the eternal and 'glorious liberty of the children of God', 'the redemption of our bodies'. The Collect teaches that the mercy of God as 'our ruler and guide' is altogether requisite if we are to 'so pass through things temporal that we finally lose not the things eternal'.

WHAT IS REVELATION?

By considering what connects these propers, we discover the characteristic marks of revelation. First, the aim of revelation is to restore our freedom so that as rational beings we might know where we are going and how to get there. We are by revelation given the knowledge of our end and the means to the end so that we may with the rational freedom which belongs to our true original and new redeemed nature direct ourselves towards it. Revelation as the communication of knowledge is addressed to man understood as rational and, because rational, capable of freedom. 'Ye shall know the truth and the truth will make you free' (John 8.32). Secondly, the revelation is thus essentially knowledge, but it is knowledge which restores and redirects

the world towards its eternal good. It is primarily theoretical, but it is a theory which includes and embraces the practical. As Thomas Aquinas puts it:

Sacred Doctrine is both practical and theoretical, just as by a single knowledge God both knows himself and what he does. It is however more theoretical than practical since it is more concerned with the things of God which already exist than with things men do; it deals with human actions so far as by them man is directed towards the complete knowledge God has and in which eternal happiness consists (*Summa Theologiae*, 1.1.4).

Thirdly, the knowledge conveyed is principally and ultimately about the eternal. It comes from an eternity which draws the temporal and physical back into itself. The purpose of this self-revelation of the eternal is that man, knowing his eternal end, might direct himself and grow towards it. Revelation is from eternity and for eternity; it concerns temporal things only as means. It is not immediately or directly a science of the temporal or physical, nor does it aim to teach us to use them except in so far as we may thereby attain eternal life.³ Scripture does not essentially then contain truth about nature and worldly ends, but it must teach us the changeless truth about eternity and those moral principles by which we may 'so pass through things temporal that we finally lose not the things eternal'. We may sum up this account in the words of Richard Hooker in his *Laws of Ecclesiastical Politie*:

The end of the word of God is *to save*, and therefore we term it *the word of life*. The way for all men to be saved is by the knowledge of that truth which the word hath taught . . . To this end the word of God no otherwise serveth than only in the nature of a doctrinal instrument. It saveth because it maketh 'wise to salvation'. Wherefore the ignorant it saveth not; they which live by the word must know it . . . sith God, who knoweth and discloseth best the rich treasures of his own wisdom, hath by delivering his word made choice of the Scriptures as the most effectual means whereby those treasures might be imparted unto the world, it followeth that to man's understanding the Scripture must be even of itself intended as a full and perfect discovery, sufficient to imprint in us the lively character of all things

necessarily required for the attainment of eternal life (v, xxi, 3; Keble ii, p. 85).

This teaching concerning the revelation in Scripture is implicit in the Book of Common Prayer and in the 'Articles of the Christian Religion' and is the explicit doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas and of Richard Hooker. It is normative Christian, as well as Anglican, doctrine.

THE MARXIST CONTRAST

This normative doctrine may be usefully understood by contrast with what now represents itself to the Church as a revolutionary new theology and our way forward, and which has an opposed view of the nature and ends of revelation and about how Scripture should be treated. This the so-called contextual, or Marxist theology, theology as praxis. For it, there can be no timeless truth. All theory is relative to the practical context in which it occurs. It is elicited and formed in reflection upon a given historical socio-economic circumstance and the true use of such reflection must be the transformation of that socio-economic reality. The practical embraces the theoretical, rather than the contrary, and man realizes himself in practical activity with respect to the natural and social world: hence, 'praxis' theology.

Praxis must be sharply distinguished from practice. Practice is subordinate to contemplation. The pre-revolutionary Christianity, drawing both on pagan reason and on revelation, taught that man was destined for a self-complete activity beyond the endless doing of things.⁴ This self-complete activity is likened to seeing or knowing, because knowledge is a possession of its object. Practice is governed by prudence, since it is presupposed that the end of practice is grasped in knowledge. There is a reasoning which is only calculation about means, but primary and presupposed is a theoretical intuition of the goal of it all. Both for Aristotle and for the Scriptures, this subordination of the practical thus requires that our goal pre-exists in an eternity of which we have some kind of apprehension in this present world.

Praxis replaces practice in the theoretical shift demanded when man is wrenched from his orientation to a transmundane eternal reality. There is then nothing but the endless alternation of calculation and doing. Doing cannot be finally directed to anything beyond itself, and praxis is the new way of designating the practical as endless and essentially purposeless.

That the Scripture should contain truth about eternal things is impossible for theology as praxis. There can be no revelation of an already complete eternity. The idea that man discovers the truth about himself and his world in an eternal heaven apprehended by loving knowledge occurs (according to this contextual theology) because man has not overcome what prevents his attaining his freedom in this world. But the problem arises that this theology is confronted by the existence of the already complete Christian Scripture. The Scriptures must reflect a previous historical socio-economic reality; how, then, are they to be employed in the present activity of theology as praxis? How are they to play a role in reflection on the very different socio-economic reality which confronts us today? How are they to help us to understand our circumstances so that we may change them and in this way bring in the Kingdom of God? The contextual theologian answers:

Reflection [on] . . . the resources of Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition . . . is informed by reason in the guise of biblical and dogmatic critiques. Just as in the first stage of reflection where reason acts as an open-ended component, always available for revision in the various sciences, so this stage is also open-ended because reason is available for revision here as new biblical and ecclesiastical critiques develop.⁵

The critical biblical scholarship of the last 150 years finds now an explicitly practical, indeed revolutionary, use. It is the means by which the teaching of Scripture is constantly reshaped to make it relevant to the struggles of our time. Modern biblical criticism thus saves the Bible from being either a mere historical document or, what is impossible for praxis, God's Word of eternal life. Critical biblical scholarship constantly reshapes the Scriptures to aid us in the timely transformation of the practical reality surrounding us.

When we began to consider this contextual theology, I hinted that I did not accept its view that it was a new approach and the way forward: this is only its representation of itself. A study of the origins of the critical biblical scholarship of the last 150 years shows that contextual theology has been with us for some time. In fact, it and the Oxford Movement arose together. Dr Pusey went to Germany in the 1820s, and his activity as the Tractarian leader was directed towards saving the Church of England from this 'rationalism'.⁶

It is now common knowledge that the Tractarian reaction against humanistic rationalism as well as the kind of response represented by the first Vatican Council and Pope Leo XIII's Thomistic revival are spent forces.⁷ Recent Roman Catholic enthusiasm for the novelties of biblical criticism and Marxist theology has obscured the intellectual difficulties of what these reactions opposed. It is my aim to sketch the character and theological presuppositions of the forms of biblical criticism which arose in the last century. The purpose is to show why, outside certain Liberal Protestant, Roman Catholic and Liberation Theology circles, there is a crisis in biblical criticism. The problem of relating theology and the Bible, treated according to the critical methods which have developed from the nineteenth century, is so acute as to make it impossibly difficult to see how to go on in the same way. Finding the place for these critical methods is now the problem not just for the Churches but 'scientifically'.⁸ It is hoped that this exploration of the relation between biblical criticism and theology will also expose some difficulties of Liberation Theology. My purpose here is to show that contextual theology is not the way forward but the decadent tail-end of a dying revolt. The biblical criticism it assumes no longer commands the allegiance of the self-aware leaders of scriptural scholarship. Theology as praxis can now only have as its basis wilful self-assertion and the determination to refashion the Christian religion in the image of that self-assertion. Finally, we shall consider in what sense a solution and way forward is to be found in what preceded the nineteenth-century revolution and the reaction to it.

THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF CRITICISM

Let us start with a word about the nature and forms of the critical treatment of texts. Any student of classical texts will be aware of how closely related are an interpreter's understanding of the content of a work and the suggestions he makes about doubtful readings of the text – both about what is doubtful and what ought to be done about the problematic passages or words. Put another way, what a scholar is often saying when he appears to be merely discussing grammar is something like: 'From my understanding of what this author teaches, a view formed by my notions of what can be or ought to be taught and thought, I know that he cannot be saying this, he means rather to say that.' This relation between the reader's prior understanding and his

intuition that he is reading the text rightly is called the hermeneutic circle. Interpretation is circular because, though understanding is informed by whatever is given in the text before the reader, he never escapes from the structure of reasoning he brings to the text. This framework tells him, for example, what kinds of texts, what genres of discourse, with what different kinds of meaning, there can be.⁹

When a scholar is only seeking to establish which words form the text of Scripture, his latitude for alteration is very restricted. The questions concern only the grammatical form of single words or phrases, and whether a limited number of small questionable passages actually belong to the original manuscripts. Any changes to be made in the received text must be justified by reference to the manuscripts and the rules of grammar. This treatment of the text is the so-called lower criticism, and it can be said without qualification that there has not been a single determination by this lower criticism which has required any change in the traditional doctrine of the Christian Church.

Things stand differently with regard to what is called the higher criticism and it is with this higher or literary criticism that this chapter is concerned.¹⁰ Although we are still dealing with judgements formed by the scholar's notions about what is reasonable and consistent, the critic has given himself much greater leeway. He undertakes, for example, to discriminate between what an historical figure is reported to have said or done according to the words of Scripture, and what he may be supposed really to have said or done. Much of the work of the higher criticism with the Gospels concerns such judgements. These are the discriminations by which scholarship has rejected as inauthentic most of the words ascribed to Jesus by the evangelists and determined that the miracles and the resurrection of Jesus are not historical events. The criteria are similarly subjective and give scope for radical dismemberment of the integrity of the scriptural books when the critic is endeavouring to distinguish the strata of a text. Here he is analysing a given text into layers, some of which he supposes were written earlier than others or by different people. For example, there is the so-called documentary hypothesis with respect to the first books of the Hebrew Scripture, J E P D. There is also the judgement of the date, sources, and temporal order of the gospel narratives – whether Mark is the earliest and was used by the others and whether the famous but undiscoverable Q existed.

Even questions about the date of books and their authorship involve

philosophical and theological considerations. For among the determinations are judgements made by the scholar based on his own views about what is possible or appropriate, or as to whether such and such is the sort of thing that the historical figure in question is likely to have said or done, or whether this idea is consistent with that, or whether this idea or form is more primitive or more developed than that. For example, if the critic does not believe that miraculous prophecy is possible, he will date the prophecy after rather than before the events with which it deals. The ideas the critic brings to the text are thus crucial. If he is able to think in the way that those who wrote the text thought, he will be successful and make right judgements about it. On the other hand, if the scholar imports ideas far distant from the logic informing the text, the opposite will result. The intellectual assumptions of the scholar will be all-important.

Contemporary biblical critics are all aware of the importance for their enterprise of the intellectual framework brought to the text by the reader – the hermeneutic circle has become a preoccupation. But they differ about the effects of the assumptions on the argued conclusions of the scholar. None would agree with the great nineteenth-century critic Julius Wellhausen. His notion that ‘philosophy does not precede but follows’ biblical criticism would be thought too naive, as also his view that the philosophy of a critic can always be disentangled from his scholarly conclusions.¹¹ Here however the accord ends.

John Barton’s recent *Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study* reveals the operation of the reader’s intuition at every level of judgement about meaning. Moreover, Dr Barton shows the relation between the methods of biblical criticism and the history of literary criticism in the last century and a half. This extends our perception of the ways in which philosophical and theological presuppositions operate to influence literary judgements as he indicates how methods of literary criticism are related to philosophical and even political projects. For example, structuralism, a currently popular method, has Marxist associations as part of the destructive exposure of bourgeois forms of life, since structuralist interpretations expose the merely conventional character of meaning in literature.¹² On the other hand, Professor John Rogerson maintains that at least some conclusions of biblical scholarship are valid independently of their philosophical and theological presuppositions. He writes, ‘Surely, the reconstruction of the history of Israel, or of the apostolic period, involves the use of an

historical method unaffected by philosophy'.¹³ His masterpiece, *Old Testament Criticism in the Nineteenth Century: England and Germany*, shows how the milieu was established first in Germany and then in England which made the reconstruction of the history of Israel, as the opposite of that indicated by the Old Testament itself, both thinkable and religiously acceptable. But Professor Rogerson wants to separate the motives of scholarship and the milieu, which allows its results to be accepted, from the results of this kind.¹⁴ His position is unconvincing. In fact, he demonstrates the crucial role for the reconstruction of Israel's history as well as for the reception of it, of a new conception of religion 'as part of the universal experience of mankind', and of the Old Testament as 'part of the religious heritage of mankind'.¹⁵ Reason then determines what are the logical stages of religion as universal phenomenon and reorders the history of Israel to conform to this pattern. It would seem wrong to dismiss for logical reasons the residual British empiricism of Professor Rogerson, but it may be fairly concluded that he has not proved his case.¹⁶

'NO DISCOVERY, ONLY HYPOTHESIS'

So, the degree to which the intellectual framework brought by the scholar to the study of Scripture is essential cannot be stressed too much. In some areas of biblical criticism it is the only determining element. Anthony Harvey, in his Bampton Lectures for 1980 published as *Jesus and the Constraints of History*, said forthrightly about the situation of the inquiry regarding the historical reliability of the Gospels:

Nothing new has been discovered. The evidence is exactly the same as it always was – the bare text of the Gospels . . . There is no discovery, only an hypothesis.¹⁷

However, the philosophical and theological presuppositions determining the methods and conclusions of higher biblical criticism are questionably appropriate to the biblical text. Moreover, this was well known to those who began the higher criticism of Scripture. They intended a revolution which would separate Scripture from the pattern of interpretation which the tradition of the Church had given it. So when Professor C. S. Lewis, speaking as a literary critic, evaluated the work of biblical scholars, he said:

Whatever those men may be as biblical critics, I distrust them as critics. They seem to me to lack literary judgement, to be unperceptive about the very quality of the text they are reading.¹⁸

Despite the constant plea of biblical critics to allow them to treat these documents as any other books would be treated by modern scholarship, it seems that something else has been going on. To quote Lewis again: 'Everywhere except in theology there has been a vigorous growth of scepticism about scepticism.'¹⁹

Historians also find that the biblical scholarship of the contemporary time lacks scientific objectivity. The whole point of Anthony Harvey's *Jesus and the Constraints of History* is that if the standard of ordinary historical research were applied to the investigation of the gospel narratives, a great deal more could be affirmed as historical fact than critical biblical scholarship has conceded.

Indeed, when we turn to the founders of higher biblical criticism, we find that they were determined to separate themselves from the presuppositions of the text they were considering rather than the contrary. Thus David Friedrich Strauss, who in 1835 set moving the nineteenth-century critique of the New Testament with his *The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined*, wrote that an interpretation is 'impartial'

if it unequivocally acknowledges and openly avows that the matters narrated in these books must be viewed in a light altogether different from that in which they were viewed by the authors themselves.²⁰

There is nothing more important to grasp than the point of this 'impartiality'. The aim of the criticism is to separate the Scripture from the Church and its doctrine, which claims to derive from Scripture and reciprocally to be that through which Scripture can be rendered intelligible. This reciprocity is necessary if both Scripture and Church are the work of the Holy Spirit. But, of course, the Church is already in the Scripture. Scripture is the religious literature of God's people, the old and the new Israel, and so the initial work of criticism is actually to rid itself of sympathy for the intellectual framework through which the Scriptures are constituted *as* Scripture, and through which they were constructed and interpreted. Making such an 'impartiality' as that of Strauss the necessary standpoint of criticism,

would be the same as requiring that no Neoplatonist could write about Plato, or that no one could write about Homer unless he assumed Homer's gods to be self-conscious fictions. There is of course no possibility of writing without an interpretative framework. When Benjamin Jowett proposed in his piece for *Essays and Reviews*, 'On the Interpretation of Scripture', that we study Scripture as we do Plato and Sophocles without interpretative presuppositions, he showed only the magnitude of his naivety. For he himself wrote about Plato from the perspective of a nineteenth-century moral idealism which scholars now regard as inappropriate. Indeed, classical scholarship in this period was extraordinarily lacking in scientific objectivity. One finds the interpretative essays of the great Sophoclean scholar, Jebb, silly and it may be said that among the most difficult tasks of contemporary classical scholarship is that of overcoming the warped interpretative framework given the field by the nineteenth-century classical scholar and philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche.²¹ An interpretative framework is necessary but there is no reason in principle why it ought not to be the traditional doctrine of the Church. None the less, the first enterprise of the higher criticism was to separate the Scripture from the doctrine of the Church in order to place it within a different philosophical and theological structure. What moved the higher criticism was not a change in the facts but rather a philosophical and theological change.

This feature of the biblical criticism of his time was well known to Dr Pusey, who wrote in his Preface to *Daniel the Prophet*, his great work in opposition to the first popularly known result of this scholarship in England, *Essays and Reviews* (1860):

Disbelief of Daniel had become an axiom in the unbelieving critical school. Only, they mistook the result of unbelief for the victory of criticism. They overlooked the historical fact that the disbelief had been antecedent to the criticism. Disbelief had been the parent not the offspring of their criticism: their starting point, not the winning-post of their course.²²

And it was equally clear to Dr Pusey's great biographer and disciple Henry Liddon, whose Bampton Lectures of 1866 are judged by Owen Chadwick to be the greatest of the nineteenth century.²³ They were entitled *The Divinity of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ* and aimed to show that the Christ who had lost his divinity to scholarship had also

lost that moral authority which the scholars wished to retain to use for their own purposes: 'If Christ is not God he is not good.' His notes on the various critical lives of Jesus exhibit his conviction that the conclusions of the critics are determined by their philosophical presuppositions and political purposes.²⁴

We must attend in detail to these presuppositions. For unless we understand and overcome them we cannot hope to return to an interpretation of Scripture in harmony with the doctrine of the Church. In general, the new interpretative framework of the critical scholars originated in the nineteenth-century rebellion not only against the Christian doctrine as an intellectual system in which man could be at home as a spiritual being; but also, this rebellion was a total revolt against the whole development of Western Culture and its defining idea that what is primary is a self-complete and all-determining intellectual and spiritual reality, a God who by his self-complete being of knowledge and love embraces the practical.

MARX, STRAUSS AND FEUERBACH

The most familiar and the most influential exposition of the contemporary (nineteenth- and twentieth-century) revolution is that of Karl Marx. Marx is explicit that his social and political revolution would not have been possible without the preceding theological revolution which provided its basis. Both involve a critique of Hegel who is regarded by theological and political radical alike as the last theologian of the traditional intellectual Christianity. At the end of 1843 and in the January of 1844, Marx began his *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* thus:

For Germany the *criticism of religion* is in the main complete, and criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism. The *profane* existence of error is discredited after its *heavenly oratio pro aris et focis* has been disproved. Man, who looked for a superhuman being in the fantastic reality of heaven and found nothing there but the *reflection* of himself, will no longer be disposed to find but the *semblance* of himself, only an inhuman being, where he seeks and must seek his true reality. The basis of irreligious criticism is: *Man makes religion*, religion does not make man. Religion is the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who

has either not yet found himself or has already lost himself again.²⁵

D. F. Strauss had published his *Leben Jesu* in 1835. Ludwig Feuerbach, the critical theologian whose ideas figure directly and very prominently in the formation of Marx's thought, published his *Wesen des Christentums, The Essence of Christianity*, in 1841. After an initial letter to him in 1843, Marx sent Feuerbach a copy of his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* on 11 August 1844 with a warm letter. His position on religion in the *Critique* is the same as that of the theologian Feuerbach, and Marx writes:

. . . I am glad to have an opportunity of assuring you of the great respect and – if I may use the word – love, which I feel for you . . . You have provided . . . a philosophical basis for socialism and the Communists have immediately understood them in this way. The unity of man with man . . . the concept of the human species brought down from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what is this but the concept of society . . . The German artisans in Paris, i.e., the Communists amongst them, several hundreds, have been having lectures twice a week throughout this summer on your *Wesen des Christentums* . . .²⁶

The Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts produced by Marx in 1844 contain much praise as well as criticism of Feuerbach as do also the *Theses on Feuerbach* of 1845. Feuerbach is again treated very seriously in *The German Ideology* written between November 1845 and August 1846 by Marx and Engels together.

For our purposes, the positions of Strauss, the biblical critic, Feuerbach, the critical theologian, and Marx are not philosophically and theologically different. Crucial to all three is a transformation of the idea of God and man by the bringing of heaven down to earth and by giving the attributes of divinity to the human race. Essential is the divinization of sensuous practical humanity. Marx goes beyond Strauss and Feuerbach only by working out the practical consequences more definitely. This is in virtue of his identification of alienation with private property, his class analysis of society, and his revolutionary programme based on this class analysis. Feuerbach remains too theoretical for Marx. Having made the sensuous world the primary reality – this makes his philosophy 'positive' – Feuerbach merely contemplates it:

Feuerbach's 'conception' of the sensuous world is confined on the one hand to mere contemplation of it and on the other hand to mere feeling.²⁷

It is important to notice this difference between Marx and his theoretical predecessors Strauss and Feuerbach because the contemporary contextual theology to which we referred earlier is explicitly Marxist rather than Feuerbachian. That is, contextual theology is involved in providing prescriptions for revolutionary practice based on a class analysis of society; to this end it finds such class analysis in the teachings of Jesus. But we must deal with this later. What we must now grasp is the common position of the revolutionaries and that, as Pusey saw, the revolution took place first in theology.

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY REVOLT

In 1828 Pusey wrote in his *Historical Enquiry into the probable causes of the rationalist character lately predominant in the Theology of Germany*:

The destructive and especially revolting characteristic of German rationalism consists of it having made its appearance within the Church, and in the guise of theology.²⁸

The revolutionary philosophy and theology originating in the first half of the nineteenth century announced the end of the previous history of civilization in virtue of its discovery of the key by which the past was determined. Marx, for example, was able to say that 'communism is the riddle of history solved and knows itself to be this solution'.²⁹ What separates the old and new world is a new conception of man. The old Greek view of him as a rational animal had been further spiritualized by the Christian religion: 'The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a life-giving spirit' (1 Cor. 15.45).

By the time of Descartes the Christian notion that reality was spiritual through and through had reached such a point that Descartes was able to have confidence that men know the sensuous and natural world by knowing it through the knowledge of God.³⁰ It is against such an intellectual understanding of man and his world that the nineteenth-century post-Hegelian German philosophers and theologians rebelled. For them, man was alienated, lost to himself, by finding his truth in an intellectually conceived God and in a humanity represented

as at home and reigning in the heavens, for example, in an ascended Jesus. Whereas in the past, spiritual progress was understood as the rise from sense to reasoning to union by knowledge and love with God; now the order was to be reversed. Human history was a movement from myth and its gods, to philosophy and its intellectual concepts to natural science and empirical knowledge of the physical world.

The notion that this is the movement of history is called positivism. In this progress man discovers himself positively, that is, he comes to be at home as a being in nature, his being as a physical, feeling, practical activity. The Marxist and existentialist forms of this new humanity are two sides of one coin. The two aspects are, on the one hand, man technologically mastering nature and, on the other, man seeking to return into unity with it. Both, however, presuppose that humanity has a being which is independent of the intellectual and spiritual substantiality, the Kingdom of God or of heaven. The Marxists will say that he is alienated or lost to himself when he attempts to find himself in such a reality; the existentialists (as in Heidegger) speak of humanity as what is thrown out of such a substantiality. In any case, for man to imagine his true home to be such an eternal intellectual heaven is false consciousness. Humanity projects an ideal of itself into heaven because it has not mastered this world or because it has lost unity with its physical and emotional self.

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT

To understand this nineteenth- and twentieth-century revolution, it is essential to distinguish it from the Enlightenment rebellion against Christianity and the substitution of reason for revelation, that is, a natural religion or deism, as the English called it. The founders of the nineteenth-century revolution thought of themselves as continuing enlightenment but, in at least two essential points, their enterprise was very different. First, as against the Enlightenment the true being of man was no longer centred in his rationality. While such a shift may be seen to have its origins in the Age of Reason (as in Rousseau and Hume), understanding the reconciliation with reality by reason to be negative as opposed to the true positive or practical and sensuous humanism is an altogether qualitative difference.³¹ Secondly, this new revolution does not see the enlightenment it offers as freeing man from the superstition which is the Christian religion but rather as the true

scientific insight into the authentic character of Christianity. The revolution soon became anti-Christian, as in Marx and Nietzsche, but the original leaders, for example Strauss and Feuerbach, understood themselves as a new kind of scientific theologian. Moreover, as we shall attempt to show below, while the revolutionary theology never gives up its presupposition of an independent, free, sensuous humanity, according to its own logic it develops a series of forms by which it identifies itself as the authentic discovery of the true historic and original Christianity. The revolutionary conception of Christianity is put thus by Feuerbach:

The Incarnation is nothing else than the practical, material manifestation of the human nature of God . . . the need, the want of man – a want which still exists in the religious sentiment – was the cause of the Incarnation . . . the incarnate God is only the apparent manifestation of deified man; for the descent of God to man is necessarily preceded by the exaltation of man to God. Man was already in God, was already God himself, before God became man, i.e. showed himself as man . . . Hence in God I learn to estimate my own nature; I have value in the sight of God; the divine significance of my nature is become evident to me.³²

Naturalistic humanism is true Christianity; this is the decisive belief of the nineteenth-century revolution. So it constitutes itself first of all by attacking the old intellectual doctrinal Christianity of the Church. The instrument of this demolition is an historical research which separates out as the truth the positive, empirically given, from the logical, the philosophical and doctrinal construct. Both a new dependence upon and a new understanding of history are essential parts of the revolutionary philosophical science or theology. Because man has turned away from the heaven of eternal essences or forms and refuses to find or establish the truth of his nature there, he must find himself and his God in history. Discerning the march of history becomes the only way of founding the substantial truth of ideas. So history becomes ideological at the same time that it becomes 'scientific'. It is too important to be left to the historians because it is necessary for determining what we can think and what we shall do. Conversely, the same confidence by which this naturalistic humanism feels itself to be the true Christianity enables it to subject the

Scriptures to this new historical scholarship so that therein may be discovered, as the original stratum of revelation, the new Christianity rather than the old.

What is found in the Bible as history changes in the shift from the Enlightenment to the nineteenth century just as the theological assumptions and methods change. When Henning Graf von Reventlow's *The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World* is considered alongside John Rogerson's *Old Testament Criticism in the Nineteenth Century*, we have the appearance in English in a single year of a complete history of Old Testament criticism from its rise at the end of the Middle Ages to the end of the nineteenth century. Professor Rogerson summarizes the crucial differences between Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment results thus:

By the close of the eighteenth century, no history of Israel had been written which presented the course of events in a fashion radically different from what is implied in the Old Testament. There had of course been attacks on the credibility of particular incidents as they were described in the Old Testament; but usually, ways could be found to salvage an historical core from the Old Testament presentation . . . Attack on individual miraculous or incredulous incidents did not lead, then, in late eighteenth-century German scholarship, to any desire to rewrite Old Testament history. The earliest chapters of Genesis were still held to contain authentic accounts of the experiences of earliest mankind, and the story of the Israelites taken as a whole could be seen as an educative process in which divine providence led the Israelites to the truths of religion prized above all in the Enlightenment: the unity of God and the immortality of the soul.³³

In contrast, Julius Wellhausen's criticism, taken by Professor Rogerson as the synthetic result of nineteenth-century scholarship, reverses the history of Israelite religion from what the Old Testament itself implies. The revealed Law is not what is originative and constitutive of Israel; rather, the Law and its institutions are late. They are imposed by an abstract reason which confines the original individual freedom and spontaneity of the early and authentic Israel. Equally, New Testament historical scholarship separates the divine Hellenized Christ of faith from the true human Judaic Jesus of history.

Revolutionary theory thus gives itself the appearance of historical actuality. It is compelled to this as it has no other way to establish its truth, and it feels no compunction in reshaping history because the new humanism is confident that it is the true result of history.

NEW SPIRIT, OLD FORMS

Because the revolution is in one form or another a naturalized practical Christianity, it is capable of reinterpreting Christianity without any conscious antagonism towards the old forms. Indeed, the new spirit may be combined with a piety towards the past and at least the outer frame and aesthetic of the old Christianity. So we have confusion rather than an attack. An example of this is the neo-Thomism adopted by the Roman Church during the last hundred years. Beginning from practical political and apologetic assumptions of the contemporary world, and, in the spirit of that world, subordinating theology to practical ends as if it were an instrument of them, the Roman Church de-Platonized St Thomas Aquinas. That is, Thomas's philosophy was separated from his theology and God was understood existentially rather than as a self-thinking Platonic form, Being returned upon itself in thought.³⁴ A similar confusion has plagued the Tractarian and Anglo-Catholic return to tradition in so far as, opposing modern rationalism and the equation of Christian faith with a new scientific theology, it became itself anti-intellectual. Thus it tried to study the theology of the Fathers without thinking through their philosophical reasoning. Pusey himself located religion primarily in a practical and moral attitude and recommended a 'devout perusal' of the Fathers.³⁵ Equally problematic is the assumption by the successors of Pusey and Liddon who, following Charles Gore, believed

not merely that credal orthodoxy and critical scholarship would prove to be ultimately reconcilable but also that properly understood they were reconciled already . . . therefore the question of priority between faith and reason was a purely hypothetical one.³⁶

Such liberal catholicism was forced bit by bit to yield ground as the conflict between the 'assured results of modern criticism' and the credal formulations of the faith became manifest. Or again, we may find Anglo-Catholics at home with an existentialist theology like that

of Dr John Macquarrie which retains the most old-fashioned piety and traditional doctrines but has de-intellectualized them and refilled the centres with an opaque Heideggerian Being.³⁷

Each of the forms of the revolutionary Christianity has produced or is producing a biblical scholarship which appears to give it historical actuality. The following examples are not intended to be a complete assemblage but should show the kinds of logic involved, indicate that the development has essentially reached its end, and manifest that we are confronted here with a factual account of the Scriptures only in a very special and historically relative sense.

KANTIAN POSITIVISM

The rationalism and its pietist reaction considered here remain within the Enlightenment as opposed to the succeeding revolutionary theology in so far as their tendency is towards a theoretical atheism rather than the divinized humanism of those who follow. None the less, they are essential to the development as they provide assumptions for their successors and pose the problem the revolutionary theology supposes that it solves.

The most important transitional figure between Enlightenment philosophy and contemporary revolutionary theology is Immanuel Kant.³⁸ Two notions of his are determinative of the direction of later thought, though how little he would have identified with their divinized natural humanism may be gathered from the title of his principal treatment of religion: *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*.³⁹ The first of his critical ideas is that reason is confined to ordering the world of sense appearances. Ultimately, this limits reason to natural science and provides the rationale of the otherwise incredible general assumption of critical biblical scholarship that the miraculous material in the Scriptures should be regarded as false except as it may be reinterpreted as the human conquest of nature. Even as late a writer as Rudolf Bultmann, who has an explicitly existentialist framework for interpreting Scripture, regards the miraculous as belonging to the mythical context of the New Testament which is unintelligible to modern man. The other notion of Kant which is determinative of what follows is that God is not known by pure, or theoretical, reason but rather is a postulate for man as a moral or practical being. In virtue of the philosophic developments

subsequent to Kant, the revolutionary theology felt itself able to liberate man from subjection to such a God who dominates man as moral ideal but who never reveals himself to knowledge. God then becomes identical with progressive practical humanity. Nietzsche is instructive on the felt necessity and logic of this overturning of Kant.⁴⁰

DE WETTE AND SCHLEIERMACHER

But before going on to the reaction against the Kantian God who remained an unattainable ideal, we must consider the biblical criticism which took as its unquestionable assumption the moral autonomy, the moral freedom, of Kant. This is the Old Testament work of W. M. L. de Wette and the life of Jesus by Friedrich Schleiermacher. It was de Wette who began to distinguish radically 'between the Old Testament story and what could be known about the actual facts'.⁴¹ He was moved to this by what was to him the inadequacy between the true idea of Hebrew religion and the Judaism of the Old Testament. In his semi-autobiographical novel *Theodore, or the Doubter's Ordination* (1821), de Wette tells us what was decisive in determining his view of what true religion must be:

Along with these biblical lectures, Theodore heard at the same time some lectures on morals from a Kantian philosopher, through which a completely new world was opened to him. The notions of the self-sufficiency of reason in its law giving, of the freedom of the will through which he was elevated above nature and fate, of the altruism of virtue which was its own justification and sought no reward, of pure obedience to the self-given moral law: all these notions gripped him powerfully, and filled him with a high self-awareness. Those shadowy ideas about the love of God and of Christ, about the new birth, about the rule of God's love in the human mind, all of which he still carried from the instruction of his schoolmaster, these he translated now into this new philosophical language, and so they appeared to him clearer and more certain.⁴²

W. M. L. de Wette shows no hesitation in reconstructing and demythologizing the Bible in accord with the true philosophical idea of religion. Schleiermacher's position is much more ambiguous. Thus those who revolted against the limits of Enlightenment humanism

learned from Schleiermacher, but heaped scorn on him for refusing to dissolve the divine into human freedom. This is the position of D. F. Strauss.⁴³ But Dr Pusey saw the other side of this inconsistency. In the midst of the rationalistic interpretation of Scripture which dominated German theology when Pusey visited in 1828, he found a pietist resistance, which though it conceded, in his view, too much to rationalism, none the less was leading theology in the right direction. That is, it refused to subordinate theology to philosophy and located religion in the affective and practical side of human personality. The leader of this movement was Schleiermacher:

that great man, who, whatever be the errors of his system, has done more than any other (some very few perhaps excepted) for the restoration of religious belief in Germany.⁴⁴

Schleiermacher granted to the positivistic rationalism sufficient that he excluded all other miracles save one, the unity of the universal and particular, God and man, in the historic individual Jesus Christ. It is instructive that, in such a theological perspective, the Gospel which was given a priority later assigned to Mark's, so that it provided the test of authenticity, measuring the others, was John's. Further, the miracle which is Christ, Schleiermacher interprets chiefly in moral categories. Christ is the pre-eminent embodiment of the ideal of truth and moral perfection which in virtue of its historical actuality in him draws humanity towards itself. God is thus present to man not as he is calculating, entangled in the relation of ends and means, but as he is actuated by a free moral spontaneity and feels therein an immediate relation to God. This understanding of Christ and of the nature of our union with him is the principle of Schleiermacher's *Life of Jesus*. His account not only demythologizes the scriptural miracles but requires a heterodox rejection of the existence of two wills in Christ – a human will and a divine will – as well as a treatment of Christ's nature which tends to docetism.

STRAUSS AND DIVINIZED HUMANITY

D. F. Strauss saw the instability in Schleiermacher's attempt to construct a Christian theology within the limits of Kant's development of enlightenment. As he indicates in the last part of his *Life of Jesus*, Strauss was convinced that the logical difficulties inherent in the unity

of the universal and particular could not be resolved in an historical individual. The traditional theologies of the Church were all inadequate on this essential point as were the more recent attempts in Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher and their followers. Only the human race itself was the adequate locus of divinity and he thought it to be the unity of spirit and nature; for him materialism and idealism should not be opposed.⁴⁵ The purpose of his *Life of Jesus* is to show that the universal and historical particular are not unified in the individual Jesus Christ and his enterprise is quite self-consciously philosophical. To F. C. Baur, he wrote in 1860 that for his procedure 'history is simply the means to a dogmatic, i.e. anti-dogmatic objective'.⁴⁶

Miracle is the manifestation of the divine in the historical particular and so it must be presupposed false. But if the life of Jesus Christ is portrayed as miraculously fulfilling divine prophecy, then his life so understood must be regarded as the fictitious invention of the Church. By the miraculous operation of the Holy Spirit, the Church finds the unity of the Jesus of history and the Christ of her theological doctrine in Scripture. The presupposition of Strauss is that what vouchsafes this concordance is false: 'The presupposition on which the whole *Life of Jesus* was written was a denial of the miraculous and supernatural in the world.'⁴⁷ In other words, the starting-point of Strauss's history is the notion that spirit cannot operate except in the ordinary course of nature. This is not what his history discovers; it is the presupposition from which it begins, the assumption which both enables and requires the separation of the humanity and divinity united in Jesus Christ or, what is the same, the separation of the Jesus of history and the Christ of the Church's faith. No historical discovery necessitated that conclusion; the so-called history is rather a result of the presupposition. Strauss's *Life of Jesus* is intentionally destructive. His positive position, which is taken up by Feuerbach and Marx, is worth reproducing at length because it is the assumption of the whole revolutionary theology of the nineteenth and twentieth century in so far as it has a positive content:

Is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far higher sense, when I regard the whole race of mankind as its realization, than when I single out one man as such a realization? Is not an incarnation of God from eternity, a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time?

This is the key to the whole of Christology, that, as subject of the predicate which the Church assigns to Christ, we place, instead of an individual, an idea; but an idea which has an existence in reality, not in the mind only, like that of Kant. In an individual, a God-man, the properties and functions which the Church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves; in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree. Humanity is the union of the two natures – God become man, the infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude; it is the child of the visible Mother and the invisible Father, Nature and Spirit; it is the worker of miracles, in so far as in the course of human history the spirit more and more completely subjugates nature, both within and around man, until it lies before him as the inert matter on which he exercises his active power; it is the sinless existence, for the course of its development is a blameless one, pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch the race of its history. It is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven, for from the negation of its phenomenal life there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a personal, national, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the heavens. By faith in this Christ, especially in his death and resurrection, man is justified before God: that is, by the kindling within him of the idea of Humanity, the individual *man* participates in the divinely human life of the species.⁴⁸

MORAL IDEALISM

Some, like Feuerbach and Marx, carried further the humanism of Strauss in a direction incompatible with the existence of religion but there was also a more conservative reaction by which a liberated humanity might deal with the Gospels in a less negative manner than Strauss had done. F. C. Baur, the great leader of the so-called Tübingen School, had taught D. F. Strauss, but his relations with him were difficult. Baur was prepared to defend him from the attacks of the orthodox, but he found his *Life of Jesus* too negative from the perspective of 'a true and real history'⁴⁹ and the two were not able to remain friends. The Tübingen School provided the stimulus for a great flowering of historical and literary biblical scholarship in the

second half of the nineteenth century. Much of it, like that of Lightfoot, Westcott and Hort at Cambridge or that of Charles Gore's liberal Catholics with their centre in Oxford, was conservative at least in the sense that it assumed that the new scholarship and traditional Christianity of the creeds were compatible, or better, that the first would illumine the second.⁵⁰ The compromise between catholicism and criticism attempted by Gore evoked scepticism and sorrow in H. P. Liddon, the disciple and biographer of Dr Pusey, who had held one of the new chairs in biblical interpretation created during the university reform. For Charles Gore was the first Principal of Pusey House, and so *Lux Mundi* appeared from the memorial to the Tractarians which Liddon had hoped would carry on their anti-modernist work. But what underlay this confidence in a synthesis between modern historical scholarship and Christianity? There is philosophically a certain return to Kant which is evident in the location of the religious impulse in man in his practical and affective aspects, in an emphasis on the 'regulative' rather than speculative character of Christian doctrine, and in the moral progressivism of Albrecht Ritschl. This is represented in England by the book which made the new biblical scholarship popularly known, *Essays and Reviews* (1860).

The aspects of this stage in the modern treatment of the Bible are displayed in the essays of the work. Baden-Powell wrote 'On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity' in a rationalistic vein which took the positivism of the natural science of the time as unquestionable. Benjamin Jowett, who as Master was largely responsible for the recent prestige of Balliol College, Oxford, where he trained the administrators of the British Empire, contributed an essay 'On the Interpretation of Scripture'. This piece contains his plea for an unbiased historical reading of Scripture, undisturbed by philosophical and theological prejudices and considerations, which prevent its sense from being clear in the way that the meaning of Sophocles or Plato is. Criticism and a personal religion are not incompatible, indeed the fight against theological prejudice and against the passions of the individual soul are but two fronts of the one battle. So the progress of science and of historical criticism against prejudice and passion are Christianized in Powell and Jowett. But Frederick Temple in his 'Education of the World', which led off the volume, expressed most naively and directly what enabled the later nineteenth century both to identify modern

science and the true historical sense of Christian religion and also to equate the imperial interests of European states, as the vehicles of this modern Christian religion, with the good of mankind as a whole.

Dr Temple compares the growth and moral progress of an individual with that of the whole human race and concludes:

. . . The successive generations of men are days in this man's life. The discoveries and inventions which characterize the different epochs of the world's history are his works. The creeds and doctrines, the opinions and principles of the successive ages, are his thoughts. The state of society at different times are his manners. He grows in knowledge, in self-control, in visible size, just as we do. And his education is in the same way and for the same reason precisely similar to ours.⁵¹

This education and progress of humanity has consequences for religion: Physical science, researches into history, a more thorough knowledge of the world they inhabit, have enlarged our philosophy beyond the limits which bounded that of the Church of the Fathers. We can acknowledge the great value of the forms in which the first ages of the Church defined the truth, and yet refuse to be bound by them; we can use them, and yet endeavour to go beyond them . . . In learning this new lesson, Christendom needed a firm spot on which she might stand, and has found it in the Bible . . . the Bible, from its very form, is exactly adapted to our present want. It is a history; even the doctrinal parts of it are cast in a historical form, and are best studied by considering them as records of the time at which they were written, and as conveying to us the highest and greatest religious life of that time. Hence we use the Bible . . . not to override, but to evoke the voice of conscience. When conscience and the Bible appear to differ, the pious Christian immediately concludes that he has not really understood the Bible. Hence, too, while the interpretation of the Bible varies slightly from age to age, it varies always in one direction.⁵²

THE 'ACQUISITION OF TOLERATION'

The tendency is the growth of toleration. When the Bible is placed within the history of a moral progress of mankind understood as the

'acquisition of that toleration which is the chief philosophical and religious lesson of modern days',⁵³ then it evokes the voice of conscience and arouses it to confidence in its private judgements. Because the Bible and the history of its interpretation belong to the stages of the education of mankind, we must not be afraid to investigate them from the perspective of the modern natural, philosophic and historical sciences:

. . . every day makes it more and more evident that the thorough study of the Bible, the investigation of what it teaches and what it does not teach, the determination of the limits of what we mean by its inspiration, the determination of the degree of authority to be ascribed to the different books, if any degrees are to be admitted, must take the lead of all other studies. He is guilty of high treason against the faith who fears the result of any investigation, whether philosophical, or scientific, or historical.⁵⁴

There are evidently many unresolved problems in this optimistic reconciliation of modern science, historical method, and philosophy. It is hard to see how the merely historical knowledge of the Scriptures can be of any religious use to a humanity which, it is supposed, has progressed spiritually beyond them, unless moral progress and toleration be taken as their actual historical teaching. This is what was found, and the true Jesus was portrayed as a moral teacher, a Jewish Socrates. The divinity of Christ and the desire for mystic union with the divine power present in the death and resurrection of the God-man was discovered to be Pauline corruption and Hellenic overlay. In any case, both the belief in the moral progress of mankind and faith in the unambiguous benefit of the development of science are casualties of the twentieth century. Progressive humanism and science are too closely associated with the overwhelming suffering and destruction of mankind and nature in this century. But before it became plain to everyone that moral progress, the growth of toleration, the education of the world and the European empires were not the Christian and human hope, Friedrich Nietzsche destroyed their philosophical basis, Karl Barth the theological ground, and Albert Schweitzer the New Testament scholarship on which they rested.

Nietzsche despised the bourgeois culture which supposed that it could leave behind the metaphysical content of Christianity and translate what remained into its own morality and religion of science.

Karl Barth was moved to his reaction against the liberal rationalist theology of the nineteenth century by its humiliation with Germany in the Great War; the identification of liberal theology with the progress of civilization had prevented the Church distinguishing its aims from those of Kaiser Wilhelm. Albert Schweitzer showed that, owing to this identification, the liberal scholars had been unable to hear the meaning of Christ's preaching of the coming Kingdom of God:

. . . one need only read the Lives of Jesus written since the sixties, and notice what they have made of the great imperious sayings of the Lord, how they have weakened down His imperative world-contemning demands upon individuals, that He might not come into conflict with our ethical ideals, and might tune His denial of the world to our acceptance of it . . . We have made Jesus hold another language with our time from that which He really held . . . It is nothing less than a misfortune for modern theology that it mixes history with everything and ends by being proud of the skill with which it finds its own thoughts - even to its beggarly pseudo-metaphysic with which it has banished genuine speculative metaphysic from the sphere of religion - in Jesus and represents Him as expressing them.⁵⁵

Schweitzer, by disclosing Jesus to be the Son of Man come to preach the end of the world in the coming of God's Kingdom, separated Jesus and his historical world from the bourgeois satisfaction with the moral progress of their world and indicated the general character of the next stage of our history. But before we look at the New Testament scholarship of existentialism, we need to attend to what it made of the Old Testament.

D. F. Strauss and his liberal successors brought out the self-creative side of modern divinized humanism; theirs was a theology expressing the more Marxist and technological aspect of the connected poles of revolutionary culture. Thus, for Strauss the biblical miracles were myths about the power of mankind to subdue nature, and for the moral idealists the coming of the Kingdom Christ proclaimed was the moral progress of humanity embodied in the triumph of modern natural and historical science. But there is another side to the divinization of man as sensuous and practical. If a spiritual heaven is the self-projection of an alienated humanity, then it must be hidden or disappear for authentic man so that he may be at home not in the *conquest* of nature,

but rather by returning *within* it. The revolt against technology, which simultaneously presupposes what it loathes; is existentialism. Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger are the greatest philosophical theologians of this stage of revolutionary thought. Its first major biblical scholar is Julius Wellhausen.

EXISTENTIALISM: JULIUS WELLHAUSEN

Professor Wellhausen's name is associated with the so-called documentary hypothesis regarding the structure of the Old Testament. Scholars claim to be able to distinguish under the text as we have it strata distinguishable from one another by the language and interests of their authors. These various sources were then woven together by editors, themselves belonging to one or the other of these source traditions which are customarily designated by letters, J E D P. So, for example, it is maintained that there are two accounts of the creation of man in Genesis: one belongs to the Priestly source, P (1.1-2.4a), the other to the source which called God Jahveh, J (2.4b-4.25).⁵⁶ In fact, Julius Wellhausen did not invent this hypothesis; it was developed over a considerable time by scholars and by itself did not arouse fervent opposition.⁵⁷ But, Julius Wellhausen's work was synthetic and his union of the hypothesis with other elements of the intellectual world of German biblical criticism did away with this openness. For Professor Wellhausen employed the hypothesis as part of the rediscovery of the true religion of Israel as opposed to the Judaism of the Old Testament itself. This was the conclusion of the work of de Wette and Wilhelm Vatke.⁵⁸ Thus, the Old Testament becomes a source book for the history of religion rather than Scripture.⁵⁹ Further, in accord with his conceptions, which approximate philosophically to the existentialism of Nietzsche, he determined the order of the developmental stages of Jewish religion to be such that the Mosaic Law appears not as the origin of the nation's religious life but as a decadent decline. This is nicely summarized by John Rogerson thus:

The study of Israelite religion was strongly influenced by philosophical theories about the nature of religion that were current in Germany between 1800 and 1850. Of particular importance was a view that distinguished between the spontaneous religion of a people in its 'infancy' and a cultic, priestly, doctrinal form of religion into which the spontaneous form developed. In

the 1870's, Julius Wellhausen . . . presented a version of the history of Israelite religion which distinguished three phases, each phase corresponding to a document or documents which made up the Pentateuch. The documents J and E . . . were evidence of a spontaneous early phase in Israel's religion, before the onset of the second phase in which there was concern for the centralization of worship and cultic regulation, as reflected in the D document . . . After the Exile, Israelite religion was completely dominated by the priests and by the minutiae of cultic regulation as seen in the Priestly document . . . Much of the material traditionally ascribed to Moses, for example, the institution of the priesthood and the sacrificial system, was, according to this approach, no earlier than the sixth century BC. Critical scholarship . . . had produced a description of the history of Israelite religion radically at variance with that in the Old Testament itself.⁶⁰

But there was no necessity for this reversal except what derived from the extremely doubtful existentialist prejudices of Wellhausen about what is original and authentic in religion and what is late and decayed. Nietzsche, reacting against the abstract intellectuality and restrictive social life of the modern technological state, wished to return to a free spontaneous human being at home in his senses and impulses; he wanted without really thinking it possible to return to an animal existence within nature. So Nietzsche idealized the Homeric heroes whom he portrayed in this way.⁶¹ Wellhausen simply does the same for the early Israelites, but his objective evidence can at most show that the Priestly written documents are *edited* late. It does not demonstrate that their content, which transmitted orally or in fragments from Moses might well have formed Israel as a nation, did not belong to the origins of Mosaic religion. Professor Wellhausen is forthright about his biases:

. . . the history of the ancient Israelites shows us nothing so distinctly as the uncommon freshness and naturalness of their impulses. The persons who appear always act from the constraining impulse of their nature, the men of God not less than the murderers and adulterers: they are such figures as could only grow up in the open air. Judaism, which realized the Mosaic constitution and carried it out logically, left no free scope for the

individual; but in ancient Israel the divine right did not attach to the institution but was in the Creator Spirit, in individuals. Not only did they speak like the prophets, they also acted like judges and kings, from their own free impulse, not in accord with an outward norm, and yet, or just because of this, in the spirit of Jehovah.⁶²

This anti-intellectual and anti-institutional bias characterizes the whole of the existentialist phase of the revolutionary theology.

EXISTENTIALISM: RUDOLF BULTMANN

Julius Wellhausen represents in biblical scholarship the Nietzschean form of the existentialist stage of revolutionary theology in which the flight from modern reason and institutions attempts to find satisfaction in a natural spontaneous individual freedom.⁶³ Rudolf Bultmann derives his principles from a twentieth-century existentialist philosopher. Bultmann continues and modifies the demythologizing of the New Testament begun by D. F. Strauss so as to make the Scripture speak to contemporary humanity as its character is analysed by Heidegger.⁶⁴ For man seeking to return within Being in its separation from thought (Heidegger's view of our situation) the true Christian religion is the proclamation of a Kingdom of Heaven which must be contradicted by everything objectively known:

There is no difference between security based on good works and security built on objectifying knowledge. The man who desires to believe in God must know that he has nothing at his own disposal on which to build his faith, that he is, so to speak, in a vacuum.⁶⁵

True faith looks for no evidence of the Kingdom now, it belongs only to the future:

this hope or this faith may be called readiness for the unknown future that God will give. In brief, it means to be open to God's future in the face of death and darkness.⁶⁶

This requires the demythologizing of Scripture in the sense that all evidence of the supernatural as objective must be eliminated.

Bultmann interprets out the miracles as did Strauss, but Bultmann does so on the ground that they belong to mythology:

which speaks about this [divine] power inadequately and insufficiently because it speaks about it as if it were a worldly power . . . Myths give worldly objectivity to that which is unworldly.⁶⁷

The resurrection is the chiefest of these miracles and is completely mythological.⁶⁸ We must place our faith in these myths but we must on no account be able in any way to know the supernatural, invisible, divine world as present and real. According to the principle that faith to be faith must contradict everything known historically or philosophically to be true, the Scriptures are criticized and the authentic Jesus is distinguished from the ever faithless Church which always seeks to have reason for what it believes.⁶⁹

This same Heideggerian existentialism can be used to interpret the Old Testament as well. Anthony Phillips has written on Genesis 1-11 in *Lower than the Angels*. The whole work is in the title. Man is lower than the angels. He must not aspire here to their intellectual existence. He must live in and struggle with the darkness of this world without the knowledge of the light of the realms above. Adam's sin is his aspiration for such angelic knowledge and Dr Phillips says of Jesus, the new Adam, that he died a believer without knowledge. Authentic man

cannot penetrate what lies behind creation – the divine realm, heaven itself (Genesis 11). In the relationship between God and man, God remains God and man man . . . This is why Christians regard Jesus as the perfect *adam*, for he alone of all men fully grasped his full human potential in his perfect relationship with his Father in which he did not grasp at divinity (Philippians 2.6), but was content to die as man, an agnostic believer.⁷⁰

Dr Phillips thus presupposes the correctness of Bultmann's interpretation of the statements of Jesus about his knowledge of the Father ascribed to him by John's Gospel; Bultmann maintains they are the interpolations of heretical gnostic mythologizers.

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY

Far more important in the history of the interpretation of the Old

Testament in the twentieth century is the work of the biblical scholars who operated within the assumptions of the so-called biblical theology. They attempted to find the structure, logic and language of theology directly in the Scriptures. Traditionally philosophy had provided the medium by which biblical revelation in its various genres – history, poetry, law, prophecy – was recast by the Church into its doctrine and theology. During the patristic period when the creeds were formed, as well as later, the medium was that of Greek philosophy. From its origins, the revolutionary theology strove with all its might to de-Hellenize the Christian religion. At first this was in order to separate it from the Church and its intellectual system. Now, with biblical theology, the aim is to find the theology of the Church directly and immediately in God's revelation in the Scripture. Christian man is still, none the less, to be prevented from ascending out of a total and serious practical struggle in this world into heavenly contemplation or mystical union with God. It is essential, therefore, to the work of biblical theology that it set up a complete opposition between Greek and philosophical patterns of thought and practice on the one hand, and biblical, Hebrew or Semitic patterns, on the other. The latter are to be normative for Christianity. Professor James Barr summarizes the opposition nicely:

the contrast may be expressed as the contrast between the divisive, distinction-forming, analytic type of Greek thought and the totality type of Hebrew thought. Hence, . . . Greek thought is supposed to have been productive of splits and distinctions unknown to the Hebrews – being and becoming, reality and appearance, time and eternity, body and soul, spirit and matter, group and individual.⁷¹

Happily, the whole enterprise is now exploded, because, on less biased examination, the required structures could not be found in Hebrew or Semitic linguistic forms, and because it occurred to thinkers that biblical theology mistook the distance and difference there must be between the Bible and theology – both lost their real shape and character when they were confused.⁷² Unfortunately, until these results become generally known we endure sermons maintaining that Christians must believe that action is all, and that Christianity and covenant, soul and body, etc., are the same, but this too will pass. What

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gives the biblical theology its power of endurance is its coherence with the thought of the greatest theologian of this century, Karl Barth.⁷³

KARL BARTH

Karl Barth's theology is existentialist in the Heideggerian sense described previously. Philosophy neither enables the Christian to rise towards heavenly knowledge nor does it mediate between the Word of God and the hearer in order to explain how the latter can understand what is addressed to him. Barth, like Heidegger, is opposed to all onto-theology, the mixing of the Greek and the Hebrew.⁷⁴ In addition, the relation of this late stage of the revolutionary theology to its nineteenth-century origins shows itself in Barth's appreciation of Feuerbach. Feuerbach is for Barth wrong about God, but his anthropology is an advance:

Feuerbach has . . . a head start over modern theology . . . I speak of his resolute antispiritualism . . . or positively, of his anthropological realism . . . He is concerned with the whole reality (heart and stomach) of man. It is only when one is thus concerned that one can in truth speak of God.⁷⁵

A little later in the same work Barth claims that Christian theology has failed to see the real Old and New Testament which speaks in this down-to-earth way and consequently

the suspicion has been aroused that in its most highly human idealism, Christian theology's 'God', or its otherworldliness, may be human illusion in the face of which it is well to remain true to the earth.⁷⁶

Or, put more directly, Barth regards modern materialism as a justified reaction to the spiritual and intellectual representation of man and God by the old theology. He is equally harsh in his criticism of mysticism, the experience of union with God. And so the existentialist phase of the revolutionary theology retains the anthropology with which the revolt originated, but now there is also a God who speaks to man from an absolute divine transcendence. It is, however, impossible in principle and incomprehensible in fact that man should hear God.

CONTEXTUAL OR MARXIST THEOLOGY

We come now to the end of the development of the revolutionary theology of the last 150 years and its result seems to be that theology finally arrives at the position of Karl Marx. For the theology of hope or liberation, praxis, or contextual theology criticizes existential theology as too subjectivist, and the position of Strauss and Feuerbach as too idealist.⁷⁷ Moving beyond these earlier stages of the revolution, it finds the Christian hope in an historical resurrection of Christ from the dead, yet this resurrection is an event not in the past or the present but in the future, a future which only occurs in the political transformation of the world. This final and decisive move into practical political history as against all forms of personal or intellectual transcendence is achieved only when theology finally comes to terms with Marx, and this theology explicitly calls itself Marxist.⁷⁸ The pre-eminent praxis theologian, Jurgen Moltmann says:

... an integration of Catholics, Protestants, Liberals, and Marxists is possible once all of them learn to look beyond their own systems forward to the future of the realm of freedom.⁷⁹

Christ, as he is experienced in the misery and oppression of the present reality, is not the resurrected but the crucified Christ:

The Christian resurrection faith is thus historically unverifiable ... [it] is not verifiable 'as yet'.⁸⁰

Only at the end of history (Marx also saw the revolution as the end of history) will the resurrection of Christ be known. But this does not mean that historical research is useless; its function

lies ... not so much in the effort somewhere to position ourselves in the process of history on the safe foundation of fixed facts, but on the contrary, in the permanent criticism which dissolves all facts in open processes and therefore all certainties and all ties in expectations and liberties.⁸¹

This dissolution is necessary because the Kingdom in which Christ's resurrection will be known is one in which all the structures of the political and social power have been dissolved.

There is in Moltmann the existentialist desire to overcome modern technology:

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In view of what is meant and what is promised when we speak of the raising of Christ, it is therefore necessary to expose the profound irrationality of the rational cosmos of the modern, technico-scientific world.⁸²

But the openness of the new society – or, put another way, the revolutionary destruction of all previous order – is total. For Moltmann, the traditional understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, which he calls ‘monarchism’, must be overcome and all that belongs to it:

The notion of a divine monarchy in heaven and on earth . . . generally provides the justification for earthly domination – religious, moral, patriarchal or political domination – and makes it a hierarchy, a ‘holy rule’ . . . The doctrine of the Trinity which evolves out of the surmounting of monotheism for Christ’s sake, must therefore also overcome this monarchism, which legitimates dependency, helplessness, and servitude . . . The doctrine of the Trinity . . . developed as a doctrine of freedom must for its part point towards a community of men and women without supremacy and without subjection.⁸³

Yet the work of theology is not theorizing; theology is political action itself:

Concrete attention must be paid to religious problems of politics and to laws, compulsions and the vicious circles which for economic and social reasons constrict, oppress or make impossible the life of man and living humanity. The freedom of faith is lived out in political freedom. The freedom of faith therefore urges men on towards liberating actions.⁸⁴

THE ‘FUTURE REALM OF FREEDOM’

This theology of a ‘future realm of freedom’ seems to have lost all actual contemplative and theoretical freedom in the present, but for its adherents it seems the true realization of everything accomplished in the earlier stages of the revolution. It demythologizes the ‘false heaven’ of religion by means of an historically progressive humanism which seriously confronts the problem of oppressive institutions. Like

existentialist theology, it is agnostic and critical of everything supposed to be objectively present. It does not idolize the current structures of civilization, neither the remnants of the old state or the patriarchal family nor the scientific bureaucracies by which modern men and nature are engineered and exploited, but opens us to a transcendent future. By making theology into praxis, it realizes and makes historically actual the revolutionary hope; that is, it turns theology into the very process of political and social, psychological and personal liberation. To do this, it need only add one tool to those already in the hands of biblical scholars. Scholars need to use their knowledge of the context of the various elements of Scripture in order to understand the structures of oppression and the Christian solution for them.

Obviously this may take many forms, including the discernment of the 'oppressively sexist' structures of life and language. It will be necessary to understand how Scripture was written and interpreted from the perspective of 'man-as-wielder-of-power'. One of the requirements of contextual 'advocacy scholarship' will thus be the 'feminist hermeneutic of suspicion'.⁸⁵

The example I have chosen shows the use of contextual theology to discover that Jesus, like Marx, understood the class structures of his time and not only did he set his proclamation of God's Kingdom against them but also he pointed the way to overcome them. In his 'Address for Ken Hamilton's Retirement' for the Atlantic School of Theology, Dogmatics Professor Martin Rumscheidt offered the following 'materialistic' analysis of the Parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard (Matthew 20.1-16). Such an analysis is necessary because 'the concern with individual life and practice is directly proportional . . . to the kind of church and theology observable in the Western world now: namely the community of those who lord it over others at home and elsewhere'.

The aim of the materialist consideration of Scripture is practical: Materialistic reading of a text or whole document wants to know out of what socio-political milieu or milieus a text came originally, how those socio-political milieus of the process of tradition and canonization shaped the text, to whom the text was addressed and who now repeats it. But the reading also wants to illumine our own existing socio-political milieus with texts that

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the all renewing, humanizing practice of messianic discipleship can advance in the historical process of humanizing human existence of making and keeping human life human.

Dr Rumscheidt uses Luise Schottroff's 'materialistic reading' of Matthew 20.1-16:

. . . one must not abstract what is said of God and of people from the fact that the parable puts those matters into the context of the labour market . . . The parable does not concern itself with pay for work done or fairness in return for services rendered: it addresses the stance of those who because of what they describe as their performance claim privilege over others . . . The context of the parable is privilege, the belief that, being equal, some of us are nevertheless to have greater privilege, greater power.

We can move from such an analysis to action in our current world; it is to move towards 'the reality of solidarity'.

And that is exactly the iconoclastic and constructive service historical materialism makes towards Christian theology, exegesis preaching and institutionalizing. It undermines the false refuge to the so-called eternal verities which truly are no more than opiate dished out to those whom one dominates while pretending to believe that we are all created equal . . . the parable has a precise, political aim: the transformation of the society which has come to stratify itself along the hard and fast lines of privilege, of life-style, of material possession and power . . . The gospel leads on to knowledge, but not knowledge as the perception of things as they are but as a consciously employed instrument in the transformation of the human community . . .

My discovery of the biblical scholarship of contextual theology is one of the occasional causes of this essay; this, for two reasons. First, because the philosophical and theological absurdity of a Marxist Christianity is matched by the obviously arbitrary subjectivity of the biblical 'scholarship'. In realizing the revolutionary theology by equating theology with praxis, the movement has not only come full circle but also has exposed that it is not theology at all. Theology as praxis claims to have faith and hope in a God who has no existence except in the political-social-personal revolutionary striving of his people. Trust in an infinite divine power which can transform the

miserable actuality of existence is the only possible ground of the endless restless human work to criticise and overturn every power. Socialist anarchy, or the solidarity of perfectly liberated natural individuals, is a contradiction incapable of any stable realization. God, infinite, omnipotent, perfectly self-complete and so able to accomplish his will through the whole course of human and natural finitude is the assumption of this theology, and yet is altogether denied by it.⁸⁶ The logical impossibility of the theology is mirrored in the end of all pretence of objectivity in its biblical 'scholarship'. To make the sexual-personal or political-economic context of the Bible the chief focus of our reading of it is self-evidently arbitrary, anachronistic and self-interested.

Contemporary liberation theology uses criticism while remaining completely sceptical about the possibility of any objectivity in scholarship. It does not wish to become conscious of presuppositions so as to strive towards a theological objectivity. Rather, it is necessary to its position that there be no historical resurrection, so that one can be made (see Moltmann at note 80 above). Structuralism is Marxist because it aims to expose all systems of meaning as conventional, bourgeois, so as to facilitate the revolution (see note 12 above). The feminists oppose any objectivity as just another form of male domination, again using reason to undermine the revelation of God in feminine sensuality and in fidelity to the life of feelings and emotions. A theology or methodology of the Word is but another trick of 'man-as-wielder-of-power' to persuade women from their interests and perspectives. Unfortunately, the scepticism into which biblical scholarship has fallen plays into the hands of this 'liberation'. When biblical scholars conclude 'if there is one tendency of biblical criticism it has been my aim to call in question, it is this tendency to seek the normative',⁸⁷ they are helpless against the contemporary forces of sceptical but determined revolution.

ACTIVITY AS A SIGN OF LIFE

The second reason Marxist theology arouses concern is that it is more directly practical than the earlier forms of the revolutionary theology and threatens the Church and the world more immediately. The Church has idolized the practical for so long it no longer has the power to resist even this absurdly contradictory 'theology'. Examples

abound; one of the complaints of my New Testament professors at seminary was that critical biblical scholarship never got out of the study; one could rarely persuade the clergy to teach it to people. It was unappealing to clergy once out of theological college because it so opposed the doctrinal, liturgical, and devotional use of the New Testament which was primarily how people expected to employ Scripture. Indeed in the diocese of Nova Scotia, M. F. Toal's *The Sunday Sermons of the Great Fathers* is more used by the clergy under forty than any critical commentary.⁸⁸ Those clergy who did try providing their people with the results of biblical criticism usually did not last long in the parish. But this new materialist reading of the Scriptures could have a different fate. Its concrete practicality makes it attractive to those who think activity in the Church is the sign of life. If the Church discovers a vocation as a socio-economic, political and personal liberation movement, then the new 'scholarship' could come out of the study into the streets.⁸⁹

This change in the role and character of theology has consequences for the study of theology. Seminaries are reorganizing their curricula to accord with the requirements of method in contextual theology. Theology is now to be done. It is to become praxis and biblical study will become an ideological activity, i.e. a means for reflecting on the world for the sake of its transformation:

The gospel leads on to knowledge . . . as a consciously employed instrument in the transformation of the human community into a community where the honoured title *human* is neither a mere rhetorical phrase nor an utopian figment.⁹⁰

This will certainly remove biblical scholars from the study into the streets, a removal just as threatening to them as to the Church and the world.

There is, however, an ironic other side to this half-realized marriage of Liberation Theology and biblical criticism which awakens hope. The last stage of the revolutionary theology is too late. Just because it can so explicitly use biblical criticism to turn Scripture into a constantly revised ideological tool, ideas of use for the multi-varied forms of liberation, it depends upon an awareness which has also overtaken biblical scholars generally that the methods of higher biblical criticism do not produce objective results. Biblical scholars are becoming aware of the philosophical, subjective, and ideological

factors in the history of critical scholarship. There is a preoccupation with the problem of hermeneutics, the categories of interpretation, and with the question of method in theology. The end of biblical theology and a recognition of the difference between the forms of Scripture and of theology has a result like scepticism. John Barton's conclusion is not merely his own. Others recognize with him that the normative question, the question as to how we should read the Bible 'can never be shown by biblical criticism of any kind, but only by theological argument lying outside the biblical critic's province'.⁹¹ The urgent search is for a restoration of a fruitful relation between theology and biblical study.

RETURNING TO A THEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING

How does the scholar bring a theological framework to the study of Scripture without arbitrariness and self-serving interest? Biblical scholars like John Rogerson, Ernest Nicholson, James Barr, Brevard Childs, John Barton, von Reventlow, reflecting on the history of modern biblical study, find this deeply troubling for the possibility of proceeding according to the already established lines of thought and methods of approach.⁹² The history of critical scholarship can be written because it is in some way complete; awareness of the history now places the scholar outside the presuppositions of his science. What formerly appeared as objective scientific fact now seems to have been determined by the philosophical and doctrinal assumptions of the scholars.

The result is that the revolutionary theology must stand on its own without the support of historical critical science. This accords with its own principles as well as with the actual position of biblical studies. Moltmann's historical critical study can only destroy and dissolve, the existent facts establish nothing, only the future can verify history. So the only basis of the revolutionary theology is the determination to remake the world by divinizing the practicality of natural man, by fully liberating him as a social animal. But this is in fact the assumption from which the whole movement began, so we now return to it naked and exposed for what it is. This is the 'late humanism' of which von Reventlow traces the history and shows to be the tail-end of the heterodoxies of the modern Western tradition: the spiritualizing

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dualism and rationalizing moralism which make incomprehensible grace mediated through history. The heterodox tendency destroys grace and history alike. He also writes so that he 'can clarify existing intrinsic presuppositions and help us to overcome them by making us aware of them'.⁹³

BACK TO DR PUSEY

We return, then, to the origins of the contemporary treatment of the Bible in the first third of the nineteenth century. But this time our attention is focused on the reaction against the revolution. In so far as our problem is to restore the relation between theology and biblical scholarship, between the ecclesiastical tradition and the Scripture,⁹⁴ we must now attend to those who turned to the Church and its traditional forms and patterns of thought in the revolutionary situation. They have been with us as opponents to the history we have traced, until finally they were drawn into it. The reaction back into older forms of doctrine and devotion took many shapes in the nineteenth century and we have not even noted the Protestant and evangelical enterprises. The resistance in the Roman Church, which was initially organized and propelled against the foe with great energy as a consequence of the first Vatican Council, did not give way until its startling and complete collapse with the second Vatican Council.⁹⁵ Just when the Roman Church took over the warfare, the Tractarian reaction surrendered to the new biblical criticism. As we have indicated, the eventual conquest of the reactionaries was inevitable. They shared the anti-intellectual assumption of the revolutionaries. The traditionalists attempted to restore the tradition without its intellectual life, just as the revolutionaries took as their assumption that man was alienated by finding himself in the Christian contemplative heaven. A commentator puts it thus:

Revolution and the reaction from it to tradition and divine authority were forms of the same: the one the separation of human and divine, the other their immediate unity. The interest of subsequent theology, as of philosophy and the revolutionary culture generally, has been to recover the lost mediation.⁹⁶

Let us consider part of how this recovery may occur in the English world. This brings us back to Dr Pusey and the Oxford Movement. Dr

Pusey, who died a century ago, was its biblical scholar; he was, from the age of twenty-eight until his death, Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Oxford. His appointment was deserved, as he had applied himself diligently to the acquisition of the appropriate philological learning. Having determined that English scholarship was inferior to German, he travelled to that country twice (at twenty-five and twenty-six) to obtain the best available there. He learned Arabic and Chaldee as well as Hebrew on what he subsequently regarded as the mistaken notion that the knowledge of the meaning of similar words in collateral languages would assist in discerning the meaning of Hebrew words.

While in Germany he discovered the development of the theological ideas and biblical criticism we have earlier explored. He wrote a two-part account of their nature together with a speculative analysis of their causes, his *An Historical Enquiry into the Probable Causes of the Rationalist Character lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany*. He regarded the results of this rationalism as mistaken and destructive. None the less consonant with his pietist-like principles, Dr Pusey hoped that this rationalism would have the effect of breaking down the orthodoxism into which German theology had ossified. That is, he hoped that the reduction of theology to rigid legal formularies might be overcome and produce a free Christianity inwardly felt and practical. He later repented this judgement as too optimistic and devoted his life to preventing the spread into England of the rationalist scholarship he had discovered in Germany. He even regretted having written the *Enquiry* on the ground that it provided information about these dangerous views and excited interest in them. This negative aspect of Dr Pusey's rearguard action expressed itself in the question of Dr Bloomfield, Bishop of London, who is said to have asked a candidate for Holy Orders: 'I trust, sir, that you do not understand German?'⁹⁷

This approach did not work. People found out about German theology and, since the same spirit which produced it animated the utilitarian philosophy of the English, it proved irresistible. Indeed, the fuss made by the conservatives about *Essays and Reviews* helped draw attention to the ideas it contained and made the defence of them heroic and popular. Dr Pusey was not himself afraid of the notions; he knew they were dogmatically asserted and imported into Scripture. He was perfectly capable of showing how question begging they were as

presuppositions of biblical interpretation. In his published lectures on the Book of Daniel, he noted that dating the book after the events it prophesied was not justified on the mere ground that miraculous prophecy was impossible.⁹⁸ There was, however, no way of sweeping back the tide. Moreover, although Dr Pusey himself held that not the words but the doctrines were inspired and indeed such doctrines as had a decisively religious significance,⁹⁹ the conservatives were afraid to yield any ground at all, and defending too much, lost it all.¹⁰⁰ So Henry Liddon had to witness the head of Pusey House make biblical criticism acceptable to Anglican Catholics.

ASKING THE FATHERS

The negative programme did not succeed, but there was a more positive side to Dr Pusey's campaign against modern rationalism and biblical criticism: the restoration of patristic study. He devoted himself to resurrecting, popularizing, expositing and defending the theology of the Fathers and the older Anglican divines.¹⁰¹ And indeed this is the only effective response to the end of the intellectual religion and institutional tradition announced and sought by the revolutionary philosophy, theology and praxis. The only way to discover and to prove that the old thinking is not a mere ideology of the past material circumstances of mankind, is to show it can govern our minds and hearts now, by thinking its intellectual content and directing ourselves in accord with the good thereby known. Since the end of our religious and secular culture comes about when modern man understands his being as sensuous and practical, we can only bring about the end of the end by becoming once more intellectual and spiritual beings.

Entering the tradition of the Fathers and the medieval doctors is an excellent place to start the recovery of a genuinely Christian biblical interpretation. Doubtless we must pass also to the Protestant Reformers, and to understand our current historical position we must find the way through modern and contemporary criticism, but the Fathers are necessary to the beginning. There are a number of ways they provide a new starting-point for biblical interpretation. First, the theology of the Fathers is profoundly intellectual in the broadest sense. They understood the Scripture through a high, speculative philosophy and through a coherent system of doctrine. The historical scholarship of liberalism and neo-orthodoxy has been incapable of properly

appreciating the dialectic according to which, in the tradition, philosophical logic and scriptural revelation mutually developed while maintaining their integrity. Still, the tools are present for such an understanding. Secondly, the patristic and medieval treatment of Scripture predates the opposition of Scripture and tradition, which opposition is made the starting-point of the revolutionary criticism.¹⁰² The result of this criticism is to turn the Bible into an instrument of the political theology of the contemporary Church; through the Fathers, on the contrary, we may learn how to unite the two with greater faithfulness to the objectivity of revelation. Finally, the earlier tradition precedes the excessive concentration on the question of the inspiration of Scripture. That is, the Fathers and the medieval doctors are not so much interested in the means by which revelation is present in Scripture. Rather, they teach that the essence of revelation is the raising of the mind of the biblical writers and of the hearers to grasp the intellectual content, the spiritual truth about God, his manner of working in us and his will for us, which it is the proper aim of Scripture to communicate.¹⁰³

THE TIDE TURNS

A number of features of the current situation in biblical and theological study indicate that such a return to a patristic mode of looking at Scripture is part of what is happening. We may think of the union of Church and Scripture in the last stage of revolutionary theology, Brevard Child's treatment of the Bible from the standpoint of canonical form, an openness to considering earlier commentary when trying to discern the meaning of the text.¹⁰⁴ There is even an endeavour to re-establish the priority of Matthew as against Mark so as to restore faith in the integrity of the patristic tradition of the New Testament.¹⁰⁵ Unfortunately, much in this is one-sidedly anti-modern. Andrew Louth's *Discerning the Mystery* uses the extensions of Heidegger by H. G. Gadamer in order to reach over the nineteenth century, the Enlightenment and even beyond the Renaissance and Reformation to the ecclesiastical tradition. We shall not surmount the limitations of the Tractarian and Thomist revivals in this way.

Despite the real difficulties about the work of B. S. Childs, and the criticisms of him by James Barr, John Barton¹⁰⁶ and others,¹⁰⁷ his efforts to reunite Church and Scripture, dogmatic theology and the

Bible must be regarded as most serious, and more promising than those of Andrew Louth. B. S. Childs assumes and uses the work of critical scholarship and he actually employs his canonical approach in the interpretation of Scripture. Moreover, he wishes, in his reunifying efforts, to retain something of the Reformation determination to allow the Scripture sufficient independence so that Church and tradition are also judged by the Bible they possess, form and interpret. He falls thus into confusions such that John Barton can show that there are destructive ambiguities as to how the canonical approach combines literary and theological perspectives. Professor Barr successfully convicts Professor Childs of incoherently intermingling several senses of canon. But Professor Childs uses the criticisms to clarify and develop his method and he is endeavouring to unite more of the elements of any convincing reconstruction of our religious culture than are his opponents. Indeed, it is hopeful that the question is becoming clearer as our distance from the nineteenth century becomes greater. For it is promised that if we ask, we shall find, and it may be that we shall in our day be given our form of the answer.

NOTES

- 1 For the notion that our present situation is 'post-critical', see John Barton, *Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study* (London 1984), pp. 84, 95ff. Dr Barton as well as B. S. Childs, *The New Testament as Canon: An Introduction* (London 1984), pp. 35-7, 50-51, John Rogerson, *Old Testament Criticism in the Nineteenth Century: England and Germany* (London 1984), note 75, pp. 195-6, and 'Philosophy and the Rise of Biblical Criticism, England and Germany', S. W. Sykes (ed.), *England and Germany: Studies in Theological Diplomacy*, 'Studien zur interkulturellen Geschichte des Christentums', 25 (Frankfurt am Main/Bern 1982), pp. 75-6 and H. Graf von Reventlow, *The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World* (London 1984), pp. 1-6 are variously concerned, after locating the cultural context or philosophical, theological, literary presuppositions of biblical criticism, either to find a place for it in reading the Scripture or to restore the context in which it appears normative or at least useful. My approach to it is as an historian of theology and especially of the history of the relation of theology to philosophy and culture generally - and indeed biblical criticism is increasingly being treated historically (historicizing the historicizers). Parts of this essay have been presented to audiences of very diverse sorts

- in 1983 and 1984 including groups at Pusey House, Oxford; St Peter's Cathedral, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island; the General Theological Seminary, New York City; St John's Church, Savannah, Georgia; the New Testament and Old Testament Seminars, Uppsala University, Sweden.
- 2 The Epistle is Romans 8.18–23, the Gospel is St Luke 6.36–42, the Collect reads: 'O God, the protector of all that trust in thee, without whom nothing is strong, nothing is holy; Increase and multiply upon us thy mercy; that, thou being our ruler and guide, we may so pass through things temporal, that we finally lose not the things eternal. Grant this, O heavenly Father, for Jesus Christ's sake.'
 - 3 Making clear what it is we are looking for when we read the Bible as Scripture is perhaps our most difficult problem. John Barton, *Reading the Old Testament*, helps define the kinds of reading (and readers). He distinguishes from each other the pre-critical, the fundamentalist and the canonical (pp. 98–9), and is helpful on the relation between criticism and fundamentalism. Excursus III, 'The Canonical Approach and the "New Yale Theology"', (Childs, *The New Testament*, pp. 541–6) is the most recent theoretical statement on the question and his works are important attempts to read the Bible as Scripture. But other recent writers are at pains to reorient biblical studies on the ground that modern critical study has frequently failed to ask questions appropriate to the character of Scripture. An excellent collection of articles is John Rogerson (ed.), *Beginning Old Testament Study* (London 1983): 'It [the Old Testament] is not the national literature of the ancient Israelite people. It is a collection of religious books . . .' (p. 2). ' . . . the Old Testament does not contain the history of ancient Israel. It contains historical and story-like traditions whose primary purpose is to express the faith of the authors of the OT that God has been involved in the events of the Israelite history. The material can be used by modern scholarship to reconstruct the history of Israel . . . Their primary purpose is not to provide source material for modern historians but to express faith in the God of Israel' (pp. 53 and 54). John Barton's essay 'Approaches to Ethics in the Old Testament', pp. 113–30, is useful on how to use the Bible as Scripture, as is John Rogerson's book *The Supernatural in the Old Testament* (Guildford and London 1976). The latter and his article in *Beginning 'The World-View of the Old Testament'* (pp. 55–73), are helpful in overcoming the positivistic bias of much critical and fundamentalist scholarship.
 - 4 Cf., for example, Aristotle, *Metaphysica* I and XII; *Ethica Nico* I, VI, X; Genesis 2.2; Exodus 20.11; Luke 10.42; 1 Corinthians 13.12; 2 Corinthians 3.18; Hebrews 4.3ff.; 1 John 3.2. On our present partial knowledge of God: by reason, cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* I, 2; XII, 7; *Ethica Nico* X, 8; by faith, cf. Hebrews 11 and 12.
 - 5 Christopher Lind, 'Method in Contextual Theology', p. 14.
 - 6 Cf. H. C. G. Matthew, 'Edward Bouverie Pusey: From Scholar to Tractarian', *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. XXXII, 1 (1981), pp. 101–24; but for a better view of Pusey showing the consistency of his anti-

- rationalist views and purposes cf. R. D. Crouse, "'Devout Perusal': The Tractarian Revival of Patristic Studies", a paper for the Ninth International Conference on Patristic Studies (Oxford 1983); idem, "'Deepened by the Study of the Fathers": The Oxford Movement, Dr Pusey and Patristic Scholarship', *Dionysius* 7 (1983), pp. 137-47.
- 7 On the intellectual inadequacies of the reaction, cf. J. A. Doull, 'The Logic of Theology Since Hegel', *Dionysius* 7 (1983), pp. 129-36; R. D. Crouse's articles cited above, W. J. Hankey, 'Making Theology Practical: Thomas Aquinas and the Nineteenth-century Religious Revival', *Dionysius* 9 (1985), pp. 85-127. In the end the reactionaries were as anti-intellectual as the revolutionaries. The overcoming of the nineteenth century is a problem of restoring the primacy of intellect.
 - 8 Cf. note 1 above.
 - 9 All of this is treated with great subtlety and completeness by John Barton in *Reading the Old Testament*. He introduces the hermeneutic circle at pp. 5-6, the problem is concisely stated at p. 18. Ultimately he concludes that there are many possible and differing readings of the biblical text, that which one we adopt is a matter of intuition and that method can inform us of how we do read the text but not how we ought to read it. Dr Barton claims only theology can provide interpretative norms. Apart from a theological intervention, criticism ends then in endless subjectivity and scepticism (this last is my judgement of his conclusion, not John Barton's own) - cf. pp. 93-9 and 204-7.
 - 10 Dr Barton maintains that the 'higher', 'lower' terminology is old-fashioned (p. 21).
 - 11 J. Wellhausen, *Beilage zur Allgemeine Zeitung* (1908), p. 354, cited and translated by J. Rogerson, 'Philosophy and the Rise', p. 63.
 - 12 On Marxism and structuralism, cf. *Reading the Old Testament*, pp. 122, 180-90; on what is involved in the shifts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries from the perspectives of the author to that of the text and to that of the reader, consult the work as a whole. To discover the philosophical changes underlying these shifts, cf. A. Louth, *Discerning the Mystery* (Oxford 1983), pp. 32-3.
 - 13 'Philosophy and the Rise', p. 64.
 - 14 'Philosophy and the Rise', *passim*; *Old Testament Criticism*, p. 226.
 - 15 *Old Testament Criticism*, p. 272.
 - 16 On the national element in these reasonings, cf. Rogerson's article and book cited, R. Morgan, 'Historical Criticism and Christology: England and Germany', S. W. Sykes (ed.), *England and Germany*, pp. 80-112; J. Barton, *Reading the Old Testament*, pp. 161ff., and B. S. Childs, *The New Testament*, pp. 542ff. For Professor Rogerson it is crucial to re-educate the English student into more Germanic ways of thought in order to make biblical critical studies more effective: 'Philosophy and the Rise', pp. 75-6.
 - 17 A. E. Harvey, *Jesus and the Constraints of History* (London 1982), p. 1.
 - 18 C. S. Lewis, *Fern-seeds and Elephants and other essays on Christianity*, ed. Walter Hooper (Glasgow 1975), pp. 106-7. Lewis's statement is typical

- of the reaction of the 'new criticism' emphasizing the 'text as it is' as against the 'personal heresy' of the author-oriented perspective which still dominated biblical criticism in Lewis's day. Biblical criticism seems to follow literary criticism at some distance; cf. J. Barton, *Reading the Old Testament*, pp. 178-9, 180ff., 154-6.
- 19 Lewis, *Fern-seeds*, p. 119.
- 20 D. F. Strauss, *The Life of Jesus critically examined*, translated from the fourth German edition, 3 vols. (London 1846) i, section 1.
- 21 The presuppositions of Sir Richard Jebb are much the same as those of Jowett; on Jowett's treatment of Plato see Ievan Ellis, *Seven against Christ, A Study of 'Essays and Reviews'* (Leiden 1980), p. 252. On Nietzsche cf. the introduction by Hugh Lloyd Jones to V. von Willamowitz-Moellendorff, *History of Classical Scholarship*, trans. A. Harris (London 1982), esp. pp. xi-xiii and his article in *Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition*, ed. O'Flaherty, Sellner and Helm (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1976); G. P. Grant, 'Nietzsche and the Ancients' Philosophy and Scholarship', *Dionysius* 3 (1979), pp. 5-16; and R. Friedrich, 'Euripidaristophanizein and Nietzschesokratizein, Aristophanes, Nietzsche and the Death of Tragedy', *Dionysius* 4 (1980), pp. 5-36. Dr Friedrich concludes that Nietzsche's 'naturalism' renders 'his views of classical antiquity eccentric and often bizarre . . . they are hardly . . . a reliable guide for classical studies' (p. 36).
- 22 E. B. Pusey, *Daniel the Prophet: nine lectures delivered in the Divinity School of the University of Oxford*, 7th edition (London 1883), p. vi; see also pp. xi and xiii-xiv, cf. Ellis, op. cit., p. 125.
- 23 O. Chadwick, *The Victorian Church*, 2 vols. (London 1970), ii, p. 75.
- 24 H. P. Liddon, *The Divinity of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ: eight lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1866*, 7th edition (London, Oxford and Cambridge 1875), pp. 501ff. His judgements, though correct in principle, are not always accurate in their identification of the precise character of the philosophical presuppositions and political intentions of the critics. For example, he holds D. F. Strauss to be Hegelian philosophically and a social revolutionary in politics (pp. 501 and 502). Horton Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and his Theology* (Cambridge, 1973) makes clear that by the time he wrote *Leben Jesu* Strauss was no longer a follower of Hegel (cf. pp. 76, 79ff., 136, 242, 270-71). See also his *Life of Jesus*, iii, sections 149-51. Strauss's unhappy political career (described by Harris, pp. 161-77) resulted from his election by radicals who drew conclusions from his theology which he did not himself draw. He remained strongly attached to a political and social order which would maintain a rather old-fashioned bourgeois culture. But even John Rogerson's *Old Testament Criticism* suffers from the fact that no one yet knows enough about both the history of philosophy and the history of biblical scholarship to bring them accurately together. For example, Rogerson designates Vatke's position as Hegelian (pp. 69-71), merely because of the idea of development but despite the fact that Vatke's notion of development would be dismissed as undialectical by

- Hegel. Conversely, we may agree with Rogerson (p. 266) and von Reventlow (n. 6, p. 626) that Julius Wellhausen's position is not Hegelian without thereby concluding with Rogerson that his work is not philosophically determined.
- 25 Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works* (London 1975) iii, p. 175. Of Hegel and Strauss, Marx comments in his *Progress of Social Reform on the Continent*, iii, p. 404: 'Hegel . . . was so occupied with abstract questions that he neglected to free himself from the prejudices of his age – an age of restoration for old systems of government and religion . . . Hegel died in 1831 and as early as 1835 appeared Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, the first work showing some progress beyond the limits of orthodox Hegelianism.'
- 26 *Collected Works*, iii, pp. 354–7.
- 27 *The German Ideology*, *Collected Works*, v, p. 39.
- 28 (London 1828), pp. vi–vii.
- 29 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, *Collected Works*, iii, pp. 296–7.
- 30 This is the doctrine both of the *Meditations* and the *Discourses*.
- 31 Professor Doull puts the matter thus: 'The principle of this revolution is an individuality complete in its separation from the universal or ideal, which appears to it as mythical', art. cit., 129. For a more extended statement, cf. his 'Augustinian Trinitarianism and Existential Theology', *Dionysius* 3 (1979), pp. 111–59. To this difference between the anthropology of the Enlightenment and of the nineteenth-century revolution there corresponds a theological difference. The Enlightenment is typically Deist and, while God tends to become more remote and abstract, the 'Christian atheism' of the revolutionary theology is inconceivable. That is, it is inconceivable that God should disappear by becoming man which is the revolutionary solution to the *Deus absconditus* of the Enlightenment. On the character of Enlightenment theism see, most recently, John Macquarrie, *In Search of Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism* (London 1984), pp. 5–12.
- 32 Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. George Eliot, introduction by Karl Barth (Harper Torchbooks, New York 1957), iv, pp. 50 and 57.
- 33 *Old Testament Criticism*, pp. 24–5.
- 34 Cf. W. J. Hankey, 'Pope Leo's Purposes and St Thomas' Platonism', *Atti dell'VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale*, ed. A. Piolanti, 8 vols., viii, 'Studi Thomistici', (Citta del Vaticano 1982), pp. 39–52; idem, 'Aquinas' First Principle: Being and Unity?' *Dionysius* 4 (1980), pp. 133–72; idem, 'Making Theology Practical'.
- 35 On Pusey's attraction to Schleiermacher and to a moral emphasis in religion see H. P. Liddon, *Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey*, 4 vols., i (London 1893), pp. 82, 159, 166, 228; and on the whole matter R. D. Crouse, art. cit.
- 36 Eric Mascall, 'Whither Anglican Theology?', *When Will Ye Be Wise?*, ed. A. Kilmister (London 1983), p. 34. Dr Mascall is reporting with approval

- the argument of S. W. Sykes, *The Integrity of Anglicanism* (Oxford 1978), pp. 21ff.
- 37 Cf. his *Principles of Christian Theology* (New York 1966), especially chapter IX, 'The Triune God'; J. A. Doull, 'Augustinian Trinitarianism and Existential Theology' contains a criticism.
- 38 Instructive on this point is the treatment of him in K. Barth, *Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl*, translated from eleven chapters of *Die Protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert* (Zürich 1952; New York 1959).
- 39 A translation which includes a useful introductory essay on the relation of pietism and rationalism in the German Aufklärung is to be found in Harper Torchbooks (New York 1960). The introduction and translation are by Theodore M. Greene. Kant's argument for limiting reason to the ordering of sensation is found in his *Critique of Pure Reason*.
- 40 See, for example, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Kaufmann trans. (New York 1969), III, 12, pp. 118-19 and *Joyful Wisdom*, Reinhardt trans. (New York 1960), IV, 335, pp. 259-63.
- 41 Rogerson, *Old Testament Criticism*, p. 49.
- 42 *Theodor*, i, p. 21; translated and quoted by Rogerson, *ibid*, p. 37.
- 43 See D. F. Strauss, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History, A Critique of Schleiermacher's Life of Jesus* (Berlin 1865), trans. L. E. Kick, 'Lives of Jesus' (Philadelphia 1977); and also *Leben Jesu*, iii, 148 significantly entitled 'The eclectic Christology of Schleiermacher'.
- 44 *Theology in Germany*, i, p. 115, n; Liddon's consideration of Pusey's relation to Schleiermacher, *Life*, i, pp. 82ff. is most illuminating.
- 45 Cf. Harris, *Strauss*, pp. 245-6.
- 46 *Ibid.*, p. 99.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 42; cf. also pp. 43, 204, 283.
- 48 Strauss, *Life of Jesus*, iii, p. 151.
- 49 Letter to Zeller, 6 November 1960 quoted in Harris, *Strauss*, p. 115. The complete chapter on Strauss and Baur in Harris is illuminating on how biblical scholarship develops beyond Strauss.
- 50 See the Preface by Charles Gore to *Lux Mundi*, ed. Charles Gore (London 1889); see A. M. Ramsey, *From Gore to Temple* (London 1960) and note 22 above. For Liddon's reaction cf. J. O. Johnston, *Life and Letters of Henry Parry Liddon* (London 1904), pp. 360ff. On Lightfoot, etc., cf. S. Neill, *The Interpretation of the New Testament, 1861-1961* (London 1964); in general: my 'Making Theology Practical', J. Rogerson, *Old Testament Criticism*, pp. 209-19 and 273-89.
- 51 F. Temple, 'The Education of the World', *Essays and Reviews* (London 1860), p. 3.
- 52 *Ibid.*, p. 44.
- 53 *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 47.
- 55 A. Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, 2nd English edn (London 1911), pp. 398-9.
- 56 A table setting out a 'Documentary Analysis of Genesis' may be found in

- Peake's *Commentary on the Bible*, ed. M. Black (London 1962), p. 176.
- 57 Cf. J. Rogerson, 'An Outline of the History of Old Testament Study', in J. Rogerson (ed.), *Beginning Old Testament Study*, p. 20.
- 58 Cf. J. Rogerson, *Old Testament Criticism*, pp. 28-49, 69-78 and p. 272.
- 59 *Beginning Old Testament Study* seems to be greatly concerned with overcoming this orientation and arriving again at an understanding of what it would mean to regard the Old Testament as Scripture, cf. note 3 above. Wellhausen resigned his theology chair because he found his researches incompatible with preparing clergy, cf. R. Smend, 'Julius Wellhausen and his *Prolegomena to the History of Israel*', in *Julius Wellhausen and His 'Prolegomena to the History of Israel'*, ed. D. A. Knight, *Semeia* 25 (Chicago 1982), p. 6.
- 60 Rogerson, *An Outline*, pp. 20-21.
- 61 Cf. *The Genealogy of Morals*, parts I and III.
- 62 J. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena to the History of Israel*, trans. Black and Menzies, (Edinburgh 1885), p. 412 as quoted by Smend, art. cit., p. 14. Cf. also D. A. Knight, 'Wellhausen and the Interpretation of Israel's Literature', in Knight (ed.), pp. 21-36 esp. 26, and 30-33.
- 63 Schweitzer's own position is not far from this.
- 64 Cf. R. Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (New York 1958), pp. 45-59, and J. Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology, A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann* (London 1955). The first pages of Professor Macquarrie's book (esp. pp. 16ff.) contain a presentation of the Old Testament 'biblical theologians' such as Wright and Eichrodt, so that it appears how they operate within the same general philosophic framework as Bultmann.
- 65 Bultmann, op. cit., p. 84.
- 66 Ibid., p. 31, cf. also pp. 40-41.
- 67 Ibid., p. 19.
- 68 Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology*, p. 185.
- 69 Bultmann's position is in philosophic principle the same as that of Karl Rahner, cf. *Spirit in the World*, trans. from 2nd German edn by W. Dych (London 1968), pp. 407-8.
- 70 A. Phillips, *Lower Than the Angels* (Oxford 1983), p. x; also pp. 64-5.
- 71 James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (Oxford 1961), p. 13.
- 72 Ibid., *passim*; B. S. Childs, *Biblical Theology in Crisis* (Philadelphia 1970); J. Barr, *Holy Scripture: Canon Authority, Criticism* (Oxford 1983), esp. Appendix III, pp. 130-71; J. Barton, 'Old Testament Theology', *Beginning Old Testament Study*, pp. 90-112.
- 73 B. S. Childs, *Biblical Theology in Crisis*, pp. 16, 56, 110; Barr, *Holy Scripture*, pp. 140ff.; J. Barton, *Reading*, pp. 208-11.
- 74 Cf. M. Heidegger, 'The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics', *Identity and Difference*, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York 1969).
- 75 Barth, 'An Introductory Essay', to Feuerbach, *The Essence* (see note 32 above), p. xxiv. For a similar judgement of Feuerbach, cf. Barth's *Protestant Thought*, pp. 357-9. Of equal importance is the degree to which Barth allows Kant to set the terms within which modern theology

- can proceed, *ibid.*, pp. 188–96.
- 76 Barth, 'An Introductory Essay', p. xxv.
- 77 Cf. J. Moltmann, *Theology of Hope*, trans. J. W. Leitch (London 1967), pp. 168ff.; *idem*, *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God*, trans. M. Kohl (London 1981), pp. 139ff. J. Sobrino, *Christology at the Crossroads, A Latin-American Approach*, trans. J. Brury (London 1981), pp. 22–33.
- 78 Sobrino, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–32 and Lind, *art. cit.*, but see Moltmann, *Trinity*, pp. 192–3, against a reflection theory of the role of religion in history.
- 79 J. Moltmann, *Religion, Revolution and the Future*, trans M. D. Meeks (New York 1969), p. 77.
- 80 *Ibid.*, p. 51; cf. also Moltmann, *The Crucified God*, trans. R. A. Wilson and J. Bowden (London 1974), pp. 166ff.; *idem*, *Theology*, pp. 172ff.
- 81 *Idem*, *Religion*, p. 51.
- 82 *Idem*, *Theology*, p. 179.
- 83 Moltmann, *Trinity*, pp. 191–2.
- 84 Moltmann, *Crucified*, p. 317.
- 85 On these developments cf. Monica Furlong (ed.), *Feminine in the Church* (London 1984) and William Oddie, *What will happen to God? Feminism and the Reconstruction of Christian Belief* (London 1984).
- 86 Cf. Moltmann, *Trinity*, chapter VI and W. Pannenberg, *Basic Questions in Theology: collected essays*, trans. G. H. Kehm, 3 vols. (London 1970–71), iii, pp. 6 and 7.
- 87 J. Barton, *Reading*, p. 207.
- 88 Four vols. (Chicago and London 1957). The situation with Old Testament scholarship was not the same so long as the biblical theology movement survived. Cf. Childs, *The Crisis in Biblical Theology*.
- 89 This has already begun even in Canada! See the contributions to the Anglicans in Mission 'Background Papers' by the Revd Carl Major, Development Education Secretary, Anglican Church of Canada, and by the Revd Cyril Powles, Professor of Church History at Trinity College, Toronto. Christopher Lind, author of 'Method in Contextual Theology' also taught at Trinity. The liturgy, together with suggestions for its use and for the sermon accompanying it produced by the National Liturgical Officer of the ACC for Anglicans in Mission Sunday, 14 November 1982, is a perfect example of the transformation of biblical eschatology into revolutionary praxis. Cf. also M. Rumscheidt's Address quoted above, A. Van Seters, 'Social Hermeneutics', in *ARC*, a publication of the theological community of the Faculty of Religious Studies of McGill University, its affiliated Colleges, and the Montreal Institute for Ministry, x (1982), 1, pp. 11–19 and the Report of the Sixteenth Atlantic Ecumenical Conference, 1981 ed. by M. R. B. Lovesey.
- 90 Rumscheidt, 'Address'.
- 91 *Reading*, p. 207.
- 92 In addition to the works of these authors cited, see Ernest Nicholson, *Interpreting the Old Testament, A Century of the Oriel Professorship* (Oxford 1981).

- 93 *The Authority of the Bible*, p. 6.
- 94 See especially Childs, *The New Testament*, on this as the critical problem: particularly pp. 21, 35–47, 541–6. At p. 541 he praises G. A. Lindbeck's *The Nature of Doctrine. Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (Philadelphia 1984) and other products of the 'New Yale theology' because 'any attempt to narrow the wide gap between dogmatic theology and biblical studies should be encouraged'. Cf. also note 1 above and A. Louth, *Discerning the Mystery*.
- 95 A brief treatment of the current situation of Catholic biblical scholarship may be found in R. E. Brown *et al.* (eds.), *The Jerome Biblical Commentary* (Englewood Cliffs 1968). The dedication to Pope Pius XII and the Foreword are instructive as to the preliminaries to the second Vatican Council.
- 96 J. A. Doull, 'The Logic of Theology since Hegel', p. 133.
- 97 Ellis, *Seven*, p. 7.
- 98 Pusey, *op. cit.*, preface.
- 99 Liddon, *Life*, i, pp. 184–5.
- 100 Cf. Owen Chadwick, *The Victorian Church*, on the causes of the rigidity and defensiveness of Victorian Christianity, on Liddon especially, ii, pp. 101ff.
- 101 Cf. Crouse, 'Devout Perusal' and 'Deepened by the Study' and A. Louth, 'The Oxford Movement, the Fathers and the Bible', *Sobornost*, 6 (1984), pp. 1, 30–45.
- 102 Cf. Andrew Louth, *Discerning the Mystery* (Oxford 1982).
- 103 Cf. for example, Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 1, 8 *ad* 2; I, 12, 11 *ad* 2. Vision of God '*in sua essentia*' is the ground of revelation and is given to Moses and Paul, *ST*, II–II, 175, 3 *ad* 1.
- 104 But see Barr's criticism, *Holy Scripture*, Appendix III.
- 105 Cf. J. F. A. Sawyer, 'A change in emphasis in the study of the prophets', *Israel's Prophetic Tradition, Essays in Honour of Peter R. Ackroyd* (Cambridge 1982), pp. 234 and 243.
- 106 Cf. James Barr, *Holy Scripture*, Appendix III, J. Barton, *Reading*, pp. 77–103, 208–11. B. Childs, *The New Testament*, pp. 22–7, 541–6.
- 107 For example, B. Orchard, B. and T. Longstaff, *J. J. Griesbach: Synoptic and Text-critical Studies, 1776–1976* (Cambridge 1979); William R. Farmer (ed.), *New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel Conference and Beyond*, (Mercer University Press 1983); B. Orchard and H. Riley, *Order in the Synoptics*, (Mercer University Press 1985).